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Advancing the Security of LDACS

Mäurer, Nils and Gräupl, Thomas and Schmitt, Corinna and Dreo-Rodosek, Gabrijela and Reiser, Helmut (2022) Advancing the Security of LDACS. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management. IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. doi: 10.1109/TNSM.2022.3189736. ISSN 1932-4537.

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Official URL: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9825724

Abstract

The "Single European Sky" air traffic management master plan foresees the introduction of several modern digital data links for aeronautical communications. The candidate for long-range continental communications is the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS). LDACS is a cellular, ground-based digital communications system for flight guidance and communications related to safety and regularity of flight. Hence, the aeronautical standards, imposed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), for cybersecurity of the link and network layer, apply. In previous works, threat-and risk analyses of LDACS were conducted, a draft for an LDACS cybersecurity architecture introduced, algorithms proposed, and the security of a Mutual Authentication and Key Establishment (MAKE) procedure of LDACS formally verified. However, options for cipher-suites and certificate management for LDACS were missing. Also, previous works hardly discussed the topic of post-quantum security for LDACS. This paper proposes a cell-attachment procedure, which establishes a secure LDACS communication channel between an aircraft and corresponding ground-station upon cell-entry of the aircraft. Via the design of a hybrid LDACS Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the choice of a pre-or post-quantum Security Level (SL) is up to the communications participants. With that, this work introduces a full LDACS cell-attachment protocol based on a PKI, certificates, certificate revocation and cipher-suites including pre-and post-quantum options. Evaluations in the symbolic model show the procedure to fulfill LDACS security requirements and a communications performance evaluation demonstrates feasibility, matching requirements imposed by regulatory documents.

Item URL in elib:https://elib.dlr.de/187783/
Document Type:Article
Title:Advancing the Security of LDACS
Authors:
AuthorsInstitution or Email of AuthorsAuthor's ORCID iD
Mäurer, NilsUNSPECIFIEDhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-1324-7574
Gräupl, ThomasUNSPECIFIEDhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7864-774X
Schmitt, CorinnaUNSPECIFIEDhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4118-1878
Dreo-Rodosek, GabrijelaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Reiser, HelmutUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date:11 July 2022
Journal or Publication Title:IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Refereed publication:Yes
Open Access:Yes
Gold Open Access:No
In SCOPUS:Yes
In ISI Web of Science:Yes
DOI:10.1109/TNSM.2022.3189736
Publisher:IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Series Name:Recent Advances in Network Security Management
ISSN:1932-4537
Status:Published
Keywords:Cybersecurity, Authentication, Key Establishment, LDACS, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Tamarin, FACTS2, Communications Performance
HGF - Research field:Aeronautics, Space and Transport
HGF - Program:Aeronautics
HGF - Program Themes:Air Transportation and Impact
DLR - Research area:Aeronautics
DLR - Program:L AI - Air Transportation and Impact
DLR - Research theme (Project):L - Cyber-Security Centric Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
Location: Oberpfaffenhofen
Institutes and Institutions:Institute of Communication and Navigation
Institute of Communication and Navigation > Communications Systems
Deposited By: Mäurer, Nils
Deposited On:23 Aug 2022 13:34
Last Modified:24 Jan 2023 18:49

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