Bridging maritime GNSS Jamming attacks by GNSS-IMU-DVL multi-sensor-fusion

Kurzfassung

Currently Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are the primary source for the determination of absolute position, velocity and time (PVT) for merchant vessel navigation. On a ship bridge a number of systems like Electronic Chart and Information Systems (ECDIS), automatic track control systems and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) are relying on that PVT provision. Nevertheless it is well known that GNSS performance can strongly degrade due to space weather events, jamming and spoofing. Especially the availability and usage of low cost jammers, so called personal privacy devices (PPD), lead to the question on how a continuous onboard provision of PVT data can be realized in the presence of such a PPD jammer. Generally three possible solutions for that challenge are contemplated: i) the usage of a terrestrial backup system, ii) a jamming resistant GNSS receiver or iii) the integration of GNSS with other onboard self-contained navigation sensors like, e.g. speed log, gyrocompass and inertial sensors (Inertial Measurement Unit - IMU). The paper will focus on option (iii) and addresses the question whether it is possible to bridge real maritime GNSS Jamming attacks by a Kalman Filter (KF) using GNSS, inertial and Doppler velocity log (DVL). The main challenge for the KF here is, that a free inertial integration needs to be performed after a time period with already degraded GNSS signal reception. As KF are known to be optimum estimators only under the assumption of known statistics of the measurements, the question arises, whether the pseudoranges under the influence of jamming still follow a certain statistics. In order answer this question an additional lab experiment was performed and analyzed. Concretely the sensor fusion was realized by using both loosely and tightly coupled architectures which have been implemented using an Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF). The fusion algorithm is formulated in ECEF coordinate frame with quaternion attitude parameterization, where the heading observability is addressed by fusing the baseline measurements from the GNSS compass. In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed sensor fusion scheme under the influence of a real maritime jamming attack we performed an experiment in our civilian maritime jamming testbed in the Baltic, which has been established together with the German Federal Network Agency approximately 6 nmi north of the peninsula Darß. Here a PPD jammer was mounted on the monkey deck of an anchored vessel. A test vessel was maneuvering around the jammer. As a test vessel the multipurpose research and diving vessel Baltic Diver II (length 29 m, beam 6.7 m and draught 2.8 m) was used, which was equipped with three dual frequency GNSS receivers, a fiber-optic gyroscope IMU and a Doppler velocity log. The obtained results confirm that real maritime jamming attacks using PPD Jammers can be bridged by the proposed tightly coupled GNSS-IMU-DVL integration scheme resulting in horizontal position errors of less than 10m only.