Stop seeing ghosts: UAV broadcast authentication

Kurzfassung

Over the last decade, significant research has been conducted in the field of connected vehicles, particularly in the automotive sector via Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs), but also extending into airspaces using drones or Electrical Vertical Take-off and Landing (eVTOL) vehicles. With numerous applications ranging from delivery services, search & rescue to commercial and private operations, it is expected that the transportation ecosystem will evolve to accommodate increasing levels of traffic and autonomy - particularly in the urban lower airspace with drones playing a vital role. Larger number of flights however also increase the risk of collisions proportionally. While some threats can be mitigated through Unmanned Aeronautical vehicle Traffic Management (UTM) methods, such as conflict-free flight plans, an independent last line of defense is essential. DroneCast aims to address this need by providing a collaborative collision avoidance system based on broadcasted position reports of all drones. However, to prevent malicious actors from disrupting orderly traffic flow by injecting ghost targets that cause unnecessary avoidance maneuvers, robust cybersecurity measures are required. This paper evaluates strategies for securing broadcast communication systems in resource-constrained environments. The analysis is conducted exemplary on DroneCast, but can be transferred to any broadcast system such as VANETs or Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Given the established constraints, different commonly used practices are compared to offer a justified proposal, which can be the foundation for future implementation within DroneCast or similar applications.