Satellite Fingerprinting Methods for GNSS Spoofing Detection

Abstract

Spoofing attacks pose a significant security risk for organizations and systems relying on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for their operations. While the existing spoofing detection methods have shown some effectiveness, these can be vulnerable to certain attacks, such as secure code estimation and replay (SCER) attacks, among others.This paper analyzes the potential of satellite fingerprinting methods for GNSS spoofing detection and benchmarks their performance using real (in realistic scenarios by using GPS and Galileo signals generated and recorded in the advanced GNSS simulation facility of DLR) GNSS signals and scenarios. Our results show that our proposed fingerprinting methods can improve the detection accuracy of the existing methods and can be coupled with other techniques to enhance the overall performance of the detection systems, all based on relatively simple metrics. In this paper, we compare the performance of several fingerprinting methods, including those from the existing literature (based on signal Gaussian properties of the signal complex envelope, energy and in-phase symbol dispersion) and one proposed in this paper, based on the satellite instrumental delay. The innovation of this work is a new jamming and spoofing complementary detection technique, based on fingerprinting and machine learning, including a new fingerprinting metric (based on the satellite instrumental delay).