Testing of a Multi-Antenna GNSS Receiver in DLR's Maritime Jamming Testbed

Kurzfassung

In this work, we present detection and mitigation algorithms against malicious and coordinated interference, custom tailored for maritime applications. Specifically, against multipath and radio frequency interference (RFI), such as continuous wave (CW), personal privacy devices (PPD) and additive white gaussian noise (AWGN) interferers, we developed a two-stage mitigation algorithm.It consists of a prewhitening approach, followed by a space-time adaptive Principle Component Analysis (PCA) beamformer that uses a compression method based on Canonical Components (CC) with a bank of signal matched correlators. The proposed algorithms are capable of suppressing strong RFI and separating highly correlated and even coherent multipath signals, thus achieving improved time-delay and pseudorange estimation performance for safety-critical applications. Furthermore, an additional algorithm has been developed to detect spoofing attacks. The derived scheme fuses the direction-of-arrival (DOA) estimation of the satellites in view with positioning information and produces a measure of confidence in the case of such an attack. Finally, we evaluate and compare the algorithms in question with real data collected in a measurement campaign performed at DLR's maritime jamming testbed in the Baltic sea.