Bamberg, Tobias und Appel, Manuel und Meurer, Michael (2018) Which GNSS tracking loop configuration is most robust against spoofing? In: Proceedings of the 31st International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation, ION GNSS+ 2018. ION GNSS+ 2018, 2018-09-24 - 2018-09-28, Miami, Florida. doi: 10.33012/2018.15912.
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Kurzfassung
The use of GNSS positioning in highly automated systems, like packet delivering using drones or self-driving cars, demands a reliable position estimation. One major risk to the position estimation is the so called spoofing threat. A spoofer fakes satellite signals in order to mislead a GNSS receiver into estimating a wrong user position. A lot of research focuses on the detection and mitigation of spoofing by evaluating several metrics implemented in the receiver. However, beforehand it should be investigated under which conditions a receiver is affected by spoofing. In this work a simulation tool is described to simulate a scenario, where a receiver structure processes a signal containing an authentic and a spoofing signal. The parameters of the spoofing signal are variated. These simulations are repeated with different receiver settings in order to evaluate robust configurations for GNSS receivers. The results show that especially the coherent integration time in the receiver’s tracking loops has a large impact on the vulnerability of the receiver.
elib-URL des Eintrags: | https://elib.dlr.de/122053/ | ||||||||||||||||
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Dokumentart: | Konferenzbeitrag (Vortrag) | ||||||||||||||||
Titel: | Which GNSS tracking loop configuration is most robust against spoofing? | ||||||||||||||||
Autoren: |
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Datum: | September 2018 | ||||||||||||||||
Erschienen in: | Proceedings of the 31st International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation, ION GNSS+ 2018 | ||||||||||||||||
Referierte Publikation: | Nein | ||||||||||||||||
Open Access: | Ja | ||||||||||||||||
Gold Open Access: | Nein | ||||||||||||||||
In SCOPUS: | Ja | ||||||||||||||||
In ISI Web of Science: | Nein | ||||||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.33012/2018.15912 | ||||||||||||||||
Status: | veröffentlicht | ||||||||||||||||
Stichwörter: | GNSS, Spoofing, Detection, Mitigation | ||||||||||||||||
Veranstaltungstitel: | ION GNSS+ 2018 | ||||||||||||||||
Veranstaltungsort: | Miami, Florida | ||||||||||||||||
Veranstaltungsart: | internationale Konferenz | ||||||||||||||||
Veranstaltungsbeginn: | 24 September 2018 | ||||||||||||||||
Veranstaltungsende: | 28 September 2018 | ||||||||||||||||
Veranstalter : | ION | ||||||||||||||||
HGF - Forschungsbereich: | Luftfahrt, Raumfahrt und Verkehr | ||||||||||||||||
HGF - Programm: | Raumfahrt | ||||||||||||||||
HGF - Programmthema: | Kommunikation und Navigation | ||||||||||||||||
DLR - Schwerpunkt: | Raumfahrt | ||||||||||||||||
DLR - Forschungsgebiet: | R KN - Kommunikation und Navigation | ||||||||||||||||
DLR - Teilgebiet (Projekt, Vorhaben): | R - Projekt Verläßliche Navigation (alt) | ||||||||||||||||
Standort: | Oberpfaffenhofen | ||||||||||||||||
Institute & Einrichtungen: | Institut für Kommunikation und Navigation > Navigation | ||||||||||||||||
Hinterlegt von: | Bamberg, Tobias | ||||||||||||||||
Hinterlegt am: | 10 Okt 2018 14:58 | ||||||||||||||||
Letzte Änderung: | 11 Jun 2024 13:50 |
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