

preprint: A Scenario-Based Simulation Framework for Testing of Highly Automated Railway Systems

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Abstract: Increasing automation is an ongoing effort across various mobility sectors, including the railway domain, promising to address issues such as sustainability, lack of personnel, and enhancing mobility in rural areas. The development of automated railway systems is a challenging task and the validation of safety of such systems in open context remains an open topic. Simulation-based validation of driverless trains can help to ensure safe operation. This paper presents an extension of the open-source train simulator OpenRails to enable doing a closed-loop simulation with the goal of validating the behavior of a system under test within a simulated environment. We propose a possible scenario-based validation approach and present the whole loop including description of an abstract scenario using Traffic Sequence Charts, derivation of a concrete instance of this abstract scenario, and a novel closed-loop play-out. We share our experiences and the current state of our work and give outlook on future directions.


1 INTRODUCTION


In the railway domain, safety critical components are classically verified using model checking or standardized catalogs of system-level tests. These methods are well suited for the certification of systems that operate in a closed environment with known state space. This is the case for grade of automation (GoA) GoA1 and GoA2 where the train driver constantly monitors the environment. For driverless train operation in GoA3/4, the safety-critical components will include perception and incident prevention systems that have to interact with an open world. With a scenario-based approach (Riedmaier et al., 2020), one has a tool to address the challenges of an open world. A scenario-driven process allows to generate critical situations in a targeted manner and thus validate the behavior of the system. Structuring the space of all possible (railway) scenarios and making sure all properties are covered in the concrete derived test cases is one of the main motivations to use a scenario-based approach. To achieve this, we use the concept of *abstract scenarios*, which allow to cluster test scenarios by fo-


cus on the relevant relations between the system under test (SuT) and its environment. For test execution, abstract scenarios are instantiated into concrete test scenarios, which precisely and deterministically define the behavior of the test environment in a scripted manner. Scenario-based methods require support from high-quality simulation-based testing frameworks which allow concrete scenarios as an input, which to the best of our knowledge do not exist in the railway domain. The creation of such a framework is part of our contribution.


Our approach for a closed-loop scenario-based simulation framework for testing of highly automated railway systems with reactive play-out (which will be detailed and evaluated in the rest of the paper) uses the test and requirement specification methodology centered around Traffic Sequence Charts (TSCs, a visual language for abstract scenarios) (Damm et al., 2018; Damm et al., 2020b) and can be summarized in three steps:

1. A first TSC (TSC-test) is used to describe an abstract test scenario, while another TSC (TSC-requirement) formalizes the required behavior of a SuT. Note, that the required behavior may be given in a simpler form, e.g., a criticality metric target value.
2. From the TSC-test, a concrete scenario is derived.

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This is possible because a TSC specifies constraints on traffic participants and sceneries. For this concrete scenario we therefore know that it satisfies TSC-test.

3. An arbitrary SuT is tested by placing it into the environment of the concrete scenario. Its behavior will likely result in a trajectory different to the one found by the SMT-solver. We need to control the test environment so that the SuT is actually confronted with events to which its reaction shall be tested. Additionally, we have to make sure that the controller of the environment does not take over the task of passing the test from the SuT.

This approach enhances efficiency by ensuring that relevant behaviors of the SuT are triggered, leading to a conclusive test verdict rather than the test simply concluding.

Our core contribution lies in step 3 and addresses two research gaps towards scenario-based testing in the railway domain: The TSC play-out technique (Becker et al., 2022; Damm et al., 2020b) incorporated in steps 1 and 2 of our approach is promising for railway test case generation as well, but so far did not allow a reactive test execution, i.e., simulated traffic participants were not able to react to the SuT. We tackle this problem with an extension of the play-out approach that allows to dynamically adapt the test execution to the SuT. The scenario-based testing approach for GoA3/4 requires simulation frameworks that also cover the interaction with other traffic participants such as road users (Wild et al., 2023). To our knowledge, such frameworks do not exist in the railway domain. Therefore, our second contribution is a prototypical simulation framework, which incorporates the open source train simulator OpenRails¹ as the simulation environment. The latter is used to demonstrate the applicability of the reactive play-out.

In the following, we give background information on scenario-based testing and testing in the railway domain, followed by a short overview of related work. Then, we explain our test framework, the reactive scenario play-out, introduce and evaluate a case study consisting of an unprotected level crossing, and end with a conclusion and outlook on future work.

2 BACKGROUND

Operations in the railway domain are safeguarded at various levels (macroscopic, operational, technical) which is reflected in the verification and validation efforts of these systems. The relevant standards are the

European EN 50126/50128/50129, covering the specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS), IEC 61508, which is a functional safety standard applicable to railway signaling and control systems, and the Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI) which is an European standard to ensure interoperability and safety across different railway systems. For European Train Control System (ETCS) components, ETCS subset-076 outlines the testing methodology required to validate the functionality and performance of these components on the technical level. When verifying safety critical functions on the macroscopic level, e.g. release of routes through the interlocking, formal verification techniques like model checking are used (Cimatti et al., 1998). Since automation in the macroscopic and technical levels are widely covered by existing technology such as automated train operation (ATO) we focus on the phenomena that are relevant for automating safety critical tasks currently done by the train driver, outside the current scope of ATO. Braband et al. compiled a function list (needed to execute these tasks) in the context of establishing risk acceptance criteria for automatic train operation (Braband et al., 2023). Examples of tasks include: assuring that an unprotected level crossing is free before passing it, supervision of passenger changes, and observation of the track for damages, obstacles, or unauthorized persons (Hampel et al., 2021; Tagiew et al., 2022). Such perception tasks are usually addressed via systems containing machine learning algorithms. While research to apply formal methods for the verification of such systems exists, it is still in early stages and major challenges need to be overcome (Krichen et al., 2022). In a closed-context, with isolated environment (e.g. metros) it is viable to analyze all possible system states and transitions and therefore apply those methods for higher grades of automation as well. This is why driverless metros already exist in many cities but, to the best of our knowledge, the AutoHaul system is the only driverless train that operates in open-context at this point (Yusuf et al., 2020).

Due to the said limitations of traditional formal verification techniques from the railway domain, we propose the use of scenario-based testing using simulations. Various studies and projects have explored the scenario-based development process of automated driving systems, mainly for the automotive domain (e.g. (Riedmaier et al., 2020; Leitner, 2020; Kalisvaart et al., 2020; Neurohr et al., 2020; Koopman and Wagner, 2018)). All these processes use scenarios on different abstraction levels. Two abstraction levels that we use in this work are *abstract* and *concrete* scenarios. According to Menzel et al., “concrete sce-

¹<https://www.openrails.org/>

narios distinctly depict operating scenarios on a state space level. [...]” (Menzel et al., 2018). This makes scenarios executable by simulators, with a predictable result. On the other hand, “an abstract scenario is a formalized, declarative description of a traffic scenario focusing on complex relations [...]” (Neurohr et al., 2021). By focusing on the relevant aspects of the scenario, they allow a clustering of infinitely many concrete scenarios into a manageable set of abstract scenarios (Becker et al., 2022). In this context, a wide range of scenario description languages (Kearney et al., 1999; Rauschert and Amid, 2024a; Rauschert and Amid, 2024b; Foretellix Ltd., 2020; Fremont et al., 2023) have been developed. Most of them rely on a predefined library of automotive-specific driving maneuvers and are therefore not well suited for the railway domain. TSCs, which we use in this work, are a scenario description language for abstract scenarios that has been applied in different contexts (Grundt et al., 2022; Damm et al., 2020a; Becker et al., 2022; Borchers et al., 2025). In contrast to other languages, TSCs are domain-agnostic and therefore directly applicable to the railway domain. Furthermore, they provide at the same time a graphical representation and a well-defined mathematical semantics to scenarios. This makes TSCs both usable by human experts and processable in automated scenario-based tool chains. In Section 6, examples for TSCs in the railway domains are given.

3 RELATED WORK

In the railway domain, formal methods are often applied to train protection systems, such as ETCS (Arcaini et al., 2020; Basile et al., 2022) and CBTC (Issad et al., 2018), or interlockings (e.g. (Haxthausen and Fantechi, 2023)). Some of these approaches (e.g. (Issad et al., 2018)) are scenario-based, but do not use dedicated languages for traffic scenarios (in the sense of Menzel et al. (Menzel et al., 2018)), as common in the automotive industry. Simulations are prominently used on the macroscopic level, e.g. by use of the SUMO simulator (Geischberger and Weik, 2022; Boockmeyer et al., 2024). Other works target the simulative testing of perception components. Decker et al. use deep generative models to vary concrete scenarios, while keeping high level-image contents fixed (Decker et al., 2023). A similar approach is followed by Grossmann et al., who sample test scenarios from a domain ontology (Grossmann et al., 2023). Both approaches focus the generation of synthetic sensor (e.g., camera) data, but not on interactions between the SuT and the environment.

Becker et al. (Becker et al., 2022; Borchers et al., 2025) use TSCs to drive simulations in the context of an automotive criticality analysis. The described framework utilizes constraint solving to translate TSCs to OpenDRIVE and OpenSCENARIO files, which are the de-facto standard for automotive scenario simulation. By the nature of the approach, the generated concrete scenarios fix all traffic participant trajectories and do not allow to react to a SuT. Therefore, it can be used for open-loop testing only, while closed-loop simulation is stated by the authors as future work. Schäfer et al. describe a closed-loop test setup to enable the execution of concrete test cases, focusing on the automation of a shunting locomotive (Schäfer et al., 2023).

With their reactive-replay approach Bach et al. could reuse recorded real automotive data in a closed-loop test setup. Their rescaling of input vectors was possible, because their SuT was a control algorithm only affecting the vehicles longitudinal position (Bach et al., 2017).

Model predictive control (MPC) has proven as an applicable control strategy to a wide range of industrial applications (Schwenzer et al., 2021), including automated vehicle path following (Faulwasser and Findeisen, 2015). In Section 5 we sketch a holistic control strategy for simulations that combines ideas from Bach et al. (Bach et al., 2017) with a simple variant of MPC.

Other than OpenRails, we considered using *ZUSI Railway Simulator* (Hölscher, 2023), *Simsphere Train* (HENSOLDT, 2023), *MST Traction Simulator* (Müller Systemtechnik, 2023), *DLR RailSiTe* (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V., 2016), *TrainSim* (D’Amico et al., 2023), and *KI-LOK* (Grossmann et al., 2023) which uses the Air-Sim extension from Microsoft. Most of them cannot be used directly in the area of scenario-based verification and validation and were built for different applications.

4 TEST FRAMEWORK

Our closed-loop simulation framework for testing is based on the OpenRails simulator. Although originally designed as a real-time game, the simulator provides an accurate model of train physics as well as the main components of railway infrastructure and operations, making it suitable with only minor adjustments. Further, it includes a web interface for remotely controlling several aspects of the simulation, such as train control inputs and the interlocking logic. Additionally, information about the current state of the simulation can be extracted using the same web inter-

face. Compared to ZUSI (Hölscher, 2023), which is a commercial training simulator offering a similar feature set, OpenRails makes the design of virtual environments easier—we are even able to script the generation of routes, which is not possible for ZUSI. Moreover, OpenRails is open-source, which enables us to implement the necessary extensions (such as point cloud simulation). Even though section 8 of the Open Rails Reference Manual² goes into a lot of detail about the implemented physics engine, please note that before utilizing the presented setup for the certification of highly automated railway systems, a tool qualification compliant with EN 50128 is mandatory.

The validation framework is a python library which starts and controls an instance of OpenRails. It offers interfaces for a test case and a SuT. The basic architecture of this framework is shown in Figure 1 and will be explained further in the following.

The **test case** is composed of a train model to be controlled, the static information about the world and infrastructure the test should be conducted in, the logic to control the dynamics of the test case (e.g. driving behavior of other trains), and test criteria to determine success or failure of the test. By expressing test cases as TSCs, we can describe them on an abstract level, and use instantiation techniques (Becker et al., 2022) to generate an arbitrary number of concrete test scenarios. In principle, **test criteria** shall be derived from the requirements on the SuT. This can be done holistically, e.g. via a threshold on so-called criticality metrics which emerge out of the traffic situation (Westhofen et al., 2022), or partially via deconstructing the high level requirement into requirements for sub-systems (Klamann et al., 2019). Examples for criticality metrics that are of special interest in the railway domain are: time to collision (TTC)(Hayward, 1972) which estimates the minimum time until two entities collide, proportion of stopping distance (PSD)(Allen et al., 1978) giving the ratio between the remaining distance of the train to an obstacle and the minimal distance needed to come to a stop, brake threat number (BTN)(Jansson, 2005) giving the normalized necessary acceleration of a train based on the movement of another entity, and the post encroachment time (PET)(Allen et al., 1978) which estimates the time between an entity (e.g. a car) leaving a conflict area (like a level crossing) and the train entering it. Criticality metrics can be used to measure the behavioral safety of a train. Depending on the use case other metrics measuring efficiency or passenger comfort can be developed. Grundt et al. in-

²<https://openrails.org/files/OpenRails-Manual.pdf>, version 1.0.3305

vestigate the suitability of TSCs for the formalization of requirements and present a concept for monitoring system compliance during validation runs (Grundt et al., 2022).

The **SuT** is a controller which can be compared to the onboard unit for automatic train operation (ATO On-board) as defined in (ERA et al., 2023), where it is limited to GoA2. It can be extended to incorporate tasks currently done by the train driver (Wild et al., 2023), necessary for GoA3/4.

The main loop of the validation framework in Figure 1 is shown by the continuous lines: After starting the test, the SuT sends its control signal to the model of the ego train, which passes it on to the OpenRails via the simulator API. Similarly, the dynamic test environment is updated by the play-out engine using the information from the test case as well as the current state of the ego train. When all the control signals are set, the simulator API triggers a simulator step of fixed size. Afterward, the simulator sends its new state to the framework via the simulator API. It will become necessary to incorporate sensors in the simulation that are not contained in OpenRails, e.g. for additional track-side equipment. Therefore, an interface exists to add custom sensor implementations to the validation framework. These can process the simulation output from which they can compute their sensor data. The combined output is returned to the SuT and all entities that are contained in the simulation. It is then used to generate the input for the next simulation step. Since we address the operational level (opposed to the macroscopic level) of the railway domain, and test cases shall be atomic, we assume the scenarios to be local and confined. Therefore the scalability of the proposed framework to larger networks should not become an issue.

5 SCENARIO PLAY-OUT

As sketched before, the play-out works on a concrete scenario derived from the TSC-test. In our case, the concrete scenario is generated in form of tabular data containing location information (i.e., position, orientation, size, etc.) for all the objects in the scenario. This includes the SuT and other traffic participants, but also the track layout (derived from the TSC), level crossings, infrastructure (such as signals) and other relevant static objects (e.g., vegetation along the track). Beside objects being physically present in the scene, TSCs can make use of any concept present in the domain ontology, such as movement authorities or environmental factors (see (Kramer et al., 2020) for an example use of environmental factors in TSCs).




Figure 1: Flowchart of the simulation framework

This information is also included in the concrete scenario and can be used for configuring the simulation setup (e.g., weather parameters) or as inputs to the SuT (e.g., movement authority).

Earlier work on TSC play-out executes the generated concrete scenario without reaction on the SuT (Becker et al., 2022). This may give reliable behavior in automotive scenarios, where the vehicle dynamics can be precisely considered by the TSC solver (Becker, 2024). The dynamics of trains, on the other hand, is harder to model due to the increased inertia, as well as different propulsion and braking systems. At the same time, driving dynamics of road users are less important. Therefore, we use a novel approach to adapt the concrete scenario – which we call *reference scenario* – during simulation to the behavior of the SuT. The intuitive idea is as follows: Because the SuT is bound to the track it will inevitably move along the path that is also contained in the reference scenario. The only way in which the SuT is expected to diverge from the reference scenario is its speed—in other words, the timing at which positions are reached. So, we can adopt the test scenario to the SuT by adjusting the *playback speed*. Intuitively, the reference scenario is delayed if the SuT starts later or travels with lower speed, and accelerated if it is faster than expected. Of course, this strategy is only valid for abstract scenarios (or portions of an abstract scenario) that do not make assumptions about duration of traffic situations. Therefore, we will provide a way to apply the time scaling only to portions of the scenario. Alternatively to the time domain, we can alter

positions (and speed) of dynamic environment objects (road users, other trains) in order to match the reference scenario *relatively* to the SuT. Most spatial relations in an abstract scenario are relative. For example, if the abstract scenario specifies a distance constraint between the SuT and a road user, we can control the road user in a way that its distance to the SuT matches the distance in the reference scenario. The play-out engine then uses a variant of model predictive control (MPC) (Faulwasser and Findeisen, 2015; Schwenzer et al., 2021) to control both the environment of the SuT (i.e., other traffic participants and trains) as well as the play back speed in order to keep the simulation as close as possible to the reference scenario.

In the following, we sketch the play-out formally. According to Menzel et al. (Menzel et al., 2018), a concrete scenario is characterized by a sequence of scenes and the evolution between them. For the purpose of play-out, we define the terms *scene*, *concrete scenario* and *abstract scenario* formally.

Definition 1 (Scenario representation). *A scene in a concrete scenario is represented as a vector $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{R}^{|\text{Attr}|}$ that has an entry $\mathbf{s}[a_o]$ for every attribute $a_o \in \text{Attr}$ of every object o that is present in the scene. The set of all possible scenes is denoted by $\Sigma \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{|\text{Attr}|}$.*

A concrete scenario is represented by a function $\sigma : T \rightarrow \Sigma$ mapping each time point in a closed time interval $T \subset \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ to a scene.

The scene $\sigma(t)$ describes the state of every object at time point t . For example, having the SuT and a road user r as objects, $\sigma(t)[v_{\text{SuT}}] \in \mathbb{R}$ is the speed of

the SuT and $\sigma(t)[\mathbf{p}_r] \in \mathbb{R}^2$ is the position of r at time t . We assume that the present objects in the scenario (so, the domain of $\sigma(t)$) does not change during the scenario. As stated in Section 2, an abstract scenario A can subsume an infinite set of concrete scenarios. We write $\sigma \in A$ if the concrete scenario σ is an instance of A . For simplicity, we assume that the same objects are present in all instances of an abstract scenario, and the set Σ of scenes is the same for all instances.

A different playback speed can be realized by a reparametrisation of the time axis of the scenario.

Definition 2. A reparametrisation is a non-decreasing and bijective function $\beta : T' \rightarrow T$ between two time intervals.

Applying a reparametrisation $\beta : T_1 \rightarrow T_2$ to a scenario $\sigma : T_2 \rightarrow \Sigma$ yields a scenario $\sigma \circ \beta : T_1 \rightarrow \Sigma$ with $(\sigma \circ \beta)(t) = \sigma(\beta(t))$. Note, that changing the playback speed may make some relations between state variables inconsistent. For example, speed is usually defined as the length of the position gradient $\sigma(t)[v] = |\dot{\sigma}(t)[\mathbf{p}]|$. If we change the playback speed (i.e., apply some reparametrisation with slope $\dot{\beta}(t) \neq 1$), it happens that, for $\sigma' = \sigma \circ \beta$, we get $\sigma'(t)[v] = |\dot{\sigma}(\beta(t))[\mathbf{p}]| \neq |\dot{\sigma}'(t)[\mathbf{p}]| = \dot{\beta}(t)|\dot{\sigma}(\beta(t))[\mathbf{p}]|$. This inconsistency is OK, because the reference scenario contains the *expected* scenes in some instance of the abstract scenario and we have to keep the original object speed information because it may be subject to a constraint. Naturally, the play-out engine cannot alter the playback speed and still obey both the absolute object positions and speeds from the reference scenario.

Therefore, the play-out algorithm uses a pseudo-metric d to compare the currently simulated scene with the scenes in the reference scenario.

Definition 3 (Pseudo-metric). A pseudo-metric $d : \Sigma \times \Sigma \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ (sometimes called *semi-metric*) is a function that fulfils

$$\begin{aligned} d(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_1) &= 0 \\ d(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2) &= d(\mathbf{s}_2, \mathbf{s}_1) \\ d(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_3) &\leq d(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2) + d(\mathbf{s}_2, \mathbf{s}_3) \end{aligned}$$

for all scenes $\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2, \mathbf{s}_3 \in \Sigma$.

This pseudo-metric allows to compare only the aspects of the scenes that are relevant for the abstract scenario (e.g., some relative distance) while ignoring unimportant aspects (e.g., an absolute position or speed).

Fact 1. For every abstract scenario A there exists a pseudo-metric $d : \Sigma \times \Sigma \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ and a set \mathcal{B} of reparametrizations such that for all scenarios $\sigma : T \rightarrow \Sigma, \sigma' : T' \rightarrow \Sigma$ and reparametrizations $(\beta : T \rightarrow T') \in \mathcal{B}$

\mathcal{B} holds

$$\max_{t \in T} d(\sigma(t), \sigma'(\beta(t))) = 0 \implies (\sigma \in A \Leftrightarrow \sigma' \in A) .$$

Proof. This trivially holds if we choose an arbitrary metric $d(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}') = \|\mathbf{s}' - \mathbf{s}\|$ on Σ (i.e., $d(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}') = 0 \implies \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{s}'$ for all $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}' \in \Sigma$), and $\mathcal{B} = \{\text{id}_T\}$ contains the identity function over T . In this case, $\sigma' \circ \beta = \sigma'$ and $\max_{t \in T} d(\sigma(t), \sigma'(t)) = 0$ implies $\sigma = \sigma'$. \square

We weaken this constraint by introducing some form of *robustness* (cf. (Fränzle, 1999)).

Definition 4 (Robust instance). A concrete scenario $\sigma : T \rightarrow \Sigma \in A$ is a robust instance of A for discretization $\delta > 0$ if there exists some known $\varepsilon > 0$ and \mathcal{B} such that, for all $\sigma' : T' \rightarrow \Sigma$ and $(\beta : T' \rightarrow T) \in \mathcal{B}$,

$$\max_{t \in T'_\delta} d(\sigma'(t), \sigma(\beta(t))) < \varepsilon \implies \sigma' \in A$$

with $T'_\delta = \{\delta k \in T' \mid k \in \mathbb{N}\}$.

The simulator works at a fixed (configurable) time step size δ . In each step, it receives simulation commands and produces the next simulation state S . Hereby, the commands for controlling the ego train are produced by the SuT and the commands for controlling the rest of the simulation by *environment controllers*. The environment controllers in turn receive their input I from the play-out engine. The play-out engine uses some function $F_\delta(S, I)$ in closed form that, from the current simulation state S (that may be given in form of a scene description according to Definition 1), forecasts the next scene that will result from simulating with input I for the environment. As an input, the play-out engine takes the reference scenario $\sigma : [t_0, t_e] \rightarrow \Sigma$, a (pseudo) metric d , and an interval $B \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ that limits the allowed playback speed, e.g., $B = [1, 1]$ does not allow any speed-up or slow down, $B = [0, 1]$ allows slow down only, and $B = [0, \infty)$ allows any change of playback speed. It keeps track of the current scenario time t . For the play-out, it is sufficient to use partial scene descriptions that only contain values for the objects and attributes that are relevant for the pseudo-metric d . In particular, static objects such as the track layout and scenery may be ignored by the play-out engine, because their position in the simulation is guaranteed to be the same as in the reference scenario. Therefore, it is sufficient if the pseudo-metric compares moving objects to their absolute positions in the reference scenario in order to assert the relations to static scenery as well.

The play-out is a simple MPC loop given in Algorithm 1. In contrast to standard MPC, a prediction horizon of a single step is used, which is for efficiency. As a second difference to MPC, we do not only optimize the controller input I but also the




Figure 2: The scenario play-out

time progress Δ on the reference scenario. The scenario time t is increased by Δ , while δ time elapses in the simulation. So, the playback speed is increased (or decreased) by the factor δ/Δ , which we call time scaling. In each simulation step, the play-out engine calculates the optimal environment input I and a time progress $\Delta > 0$ such that $\Delta/\delta \in B$, and the distance between the next scene $\sigma(t + \Delta)$ in the reference scenario and the next (forecast) simulated scene will be minimal. Our prototype implementation (see Section 6) uses some general purpose numeric optimization method.

Data: reference scenario $\sigma : [t_0, t_e] \rightarrow \Sigma$, step size $\delta > 0$, forecast function F_δ , time scaling interval B

Input: Current simulation state S in every simulation step

Output: Next input for environment controllers in every step

$t \leftarrow t_0$;

Initialize the simulation with $\sigma(t_0)$;

for every step do

receive simulation state S ;

$I, \Delta \leftarrow \arg \min_{I, \Delta} d(F_\delta(S, I), \sigma(t + \Delta))$

 subject to $\Delta/\delta \in B$;

send input I ;

$t \leftarrow t + \Delta$;

if $t > t_e$ **then stop**;

end

Algorithm 1: The play-out loop

The choice of a different scenario time progress Δ in each simulation step leads to the aforementioned reparametrization β of the reference scenario. This reparametrization can be constructed as a piecewise

linear function

$$\beta(k\delta + t) = t_k + \frac{t\Delta_k}{\delta} \text{ for } t \in [0, \delta], k = 0, 1, \dots$$

where t_k is the scenario time, and $\Delta_k = t_{k+1} - t_k$ the time progress in simulation step k .

The sketched play-out algorithm can be further extended to apply different pseudo-metrics and time scaling intervals B during a scenario. Then, d and B are replaced by a time-dependent pseudo-metric d_t and interval B_t , where t is the current scenario time. This allows, e.g., to adapt to the SuT behavior only during some built-up phase of the test scenario, and control the environment deterministically afterwards when the reaction of the SuT is tested. An example of such a time-dependent pseudo-metric is given in the following section.

6 CASE STUDY: LEVEL CROSSING

Figure 3 shows a TSC that formalizes the required behavior of a train as specified in the German train driver operating instructions (Deutsche Bahn AG, 2015) on an unprotected level crossing. We assume that the maximum allowed speed on the track section is 30km/h (8.33m/s). When approaching, a train has to:

1. stop in front of the crossing and sound the horn
2. enter the crossing with low speed if the level crossing is free
3. leave the crossing quickly as soon as the middle of the road is reached by the first vehicle.

In a TSC, traffic situations are depicted graphically by placing object symbols inside so-called *spatial views*. The relative placement of objects in a spatial view indicates spatial relations between the objects in the scenario. Green dashed *somewhere-boxes* indicate a position somewhere in the marked area, while red dashed and crossed *nowhere-boxes* denote absence of objects. Spatial views can be further annotated by distances and textual predicates. For example, the level crossing being free is specified as absence of objects on, or vehicles with positive velocity ($v > 0$) moving towards the level crossing. Spatial views can be combined using different operators such as sequence, choice, parallel composition, and negation. We refer the interested reader to (Damm et al., 2018) for a complete description of the TSC formalism.

Figure 4 shows a possible TSC-test for the level crossing rule. It describes the start, intermediate, and




Figure 3: A TSC that describes the required behavior on a level crossing without barriers

end situation (the shaded box is an empty spatial view allowing any behavior). In the beginning, the train is on the start of the test track, with the level crossing at least 200 m ahead. A road user is 100 m away from the level crossing. During the specified scenario, the road user is blocking the level crossing when the train is more than 30 m and less than 70 m away. The road user stays there for 15 s. At the end of the specified scenario, the road user leaves the level crossing. Note, that the TSC in Figure 4 only describes the test input, but not the expected reaction of the SuT: Starting with the third spatial view (from the right), the train is not shown anymore. In a TSC, this does not mean that it is not present in the scenario anymore, but that it shall not be constrained by the depicted scene. So, for evaluation of the test case, we need to observe both the correct execution of TSC-test in Figure 4 and TSC-requirement in Figure 3.

We make the reasonable assumption that the SuT is aware of its distance to the unprotected level crossing. Via its braking curve (European Railway Agency, 2020) it knows which brake force to apply in order to safely stop at the level crossing. After the absence of obstacles is ensured via a lidar sensor model, the SuT accelerates to 5 km/h until the middle of the first wagon reaches the level crossing and then clears it as fast as possible.

The reference scenario for the test execution is derived from the TSC-test via constraint solving as sketched in (Becker et al., 2022; Becker, 2024). This approach ensures that the movement of the road user in the reference scenario is smooth. Since realistic driving physics of the road user are uncritical for validation of the SuT³, we refrain from simulating the road user with a physics engine. Instead, the road user controller sends simulation commands that directly update its position.

The play-out algorithm has been implemented in

³One may even argue that the SuT shall be able to react to road users that behave in an unexpected way.

Python using the `minimize` function (with default parameters) from the SciPy package (Virtanen et al., 2020) for bounded optimization of the control values. The controller input to be optimized by the play-out engine is the road user position $I = (x'_r, y'_r)$ for the next simulation step. The relevant part of the simulation state $S = (x_e, v_e, x_r, y_r)$ consists of the ego train's x -position and speed, as well as the current road user position. Each scene in the reference scenario is described as a vector $\mathbf{s} = (x_e \ x_r \ y_r)^T$. Other attributes are not relevant for the scenario and therefore omitted from the scene description. Furthermore, we can omit the position of the level crossing, because it is guaranteed to be the same as in the reference scenario. We use a simple forecast function

$$F_{\delta}(S, I) := (x_e + \delta v_e \ x'_r \ y'_r)^T$$

that extrapolates the train position by its current speed, and otherwise assumes that the road user position can be precisely set.

The pseudo-metric and the allowed slope of the reparametrizations (i.e., the time scaling) depend on the current spatial view in TSC-test. Therefore, we split the time domain of the reference scenario in six intervals that correspond to the spatial views in Figure 4 (note that the empty spatial view \square is included). For each interval we define a pseudo-metric and time scaling interval. The pseudo-metric d_t is the weighted square pseudo-metric $d_t(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}') = (\mathbf{x}_t^T (\mathbf{s}' - \mathbf{s}))^2$. Here, the row vector $\mathbf{x}_t^T = (a_t \ 1 \ 1)$ defines a variable weight a_t for the train position and weights the road user position with 1. The values for a_t and B_t are listed in Table 1. Note that, starting with the fourth spatial view in Figure 4, the train behavior is not specified and therefore the corresponding a_t are zero. This makes the control of the road user independent from the SuT behavior and ensures a meaningful test evaluation in case the SuT fails to stop in front of the level crossing. The chosen time scaling intervals B_t suppress time scaling during the time-constrained spatial




Figure 4: A TSC describing a test scenario with a blocked, unprotected level crossing

Table 1: Parameters for play-out

$t \in$	a_t	B_t
$[0\text{ s}, 5\text{ s})$	1	$[0, 1 + (45\text{ s} - t)/\delta]$
$[5\text{ s}, 40\text{ s})$	1	$[0, 1 + (45\text{ s} - t)/\delta]$
$[40\text{ s}, 45\text{ s})$	1	$[0, 1 + (45\text{ s} - t)/\delta]$
$[45\text{ s}, 80\text{ s})$	0	$[1, 1]$
$[80\text{ s}, 95\text{ s})$	0	$[0, \infty)$
$[95\text{ s}, 100\text{ s}]$	0	$[0, \infty)$

view, and allow any change of the playback speed otherwise. However, the upper bound $1 + (45\text{ s} - t)/\delta$ of B_t for $t < 45\text{ s}$ ensures that the time progress is limited to $t + \Delta \leq 45\text{ s} + \delta$ and cannot range more than δ into the time-constrained spatial view that starts at $t = 45\text{ s}$.

7 TEST EVALUATION

In Figure 5 the positions of the ego train and the car in the reference scenario are shown. Note, that the road is orthogonal to the railway track, so the road user x -position remains constant and is not shown in the figure. This scenario satisfies TSC-test by construction. The SuT which is controlling the train is implemented as a state-machine⁴ with specific states and transition rules. We assume knowledge of the position of the unprotected level crossing, which has to be treated as the end of the train's movement authority (EOA) (European Union, 2023). The (sub-)controllers in the specific states are implemented as proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controllers. The states include *approaching*, *braking*, *slow crossing*, and *leaving*. The transition rules include a *crossing free* check, which uses the emulated lidar sensor Figure 6. To estimate when we need to transition to the braking phase we use braking curves which were previously recorded using the simulator for our specific consist⁵. Based on the braking curves we derive the set point (in the form of target velocities) for the PID-controller.

⁴<https://pypi.org/project/python-statemachine/>

⁵a specific arrangement of locomotives and railcars that make up a train is called a consist




Figure 5: Positions of the ego train (blue solid line) and the road user (orange dashed line) in the reference scenario.




Figure 6: Emulated lidar point cloud of the car on the level crossing. Visualized with WebLabel Player (<https://github.com/Vicomtech/weblabel>) published by Vicomtech Research Foundation.

In Figure 7 we see the result of the behavior of the SuT in the form of its velocity and position, as well as the set velocity for the PID controller. The different states can be identified via the different set velocities. The step size δ was set to 100 ms.

The test evaluation is twofold. Firstly, we check if the test case was left via the metric introduced in section 5. As can be see in Figure 8 (bottom plot), the




Figure 7: Behavior of the SuT. The black solid line shows the set velocity for the PID controller, the orange dash-dot line the actual velocity and the dashed blue line the position of the ego train.




Figure 8: Time scaling and scenario discrepancy.

scenario discrepancy is below 0.015 m^2 in all simulation steps. Recalling that the used pseudo-metric is based on a square norm, this means that the positions of train and road user deviate at most by $\sqrt{0.015 \text{ m}^2} \approx 12 \text{ cm}$ from the reference scenario. In fact, the peak at $t = 5 \text{ s}$ in Figure 8 is a numerical artefact: Due to the low acceleration of the train in the beginning of the reference scenario, the numerical solver fails to find the exact optimum. However, we consider this deviation to be small enough that the reference scenario could successfully be adapted to the behavior of the SuT.

Secondly, we check if TSC-requirement (Figure 4) is obeyed. For now, this is done visually by person via observing how the simulation unfolds via the emulated RGB camera image shown in Figure 9. We verify that the ego train stops in front of the level crossing when blocked by a road user and continues the journey when the level crossing is free. In the future we will investigate the use of TSC monitors as described by Grundt et al. (Grundt et al., 2022) for this purpose.




Figure 9: Emulated RGB camera image showing the car approaching the level crossing.

8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this work we introduced a novel method for play-out using temporal rescaling which assures that a test-case specified using a TSC is not left. We further presented our closed-loop simulation framework for testing. We demonstrated the applicability of OpenRails as a simulator for this purpose by testing a simple SuT which is based on PID-controllers.

In the future, we will model additional abstract scenarios formalizing different required behaviors of the ego train, as well as the respective test cases. Future scenarios may contain multiple trains, e.g. for testing virtual coupling of two or more trains. This will require additional controllers and test-criteria. Also, more sophisticated controllers for the existing level-crossing example shall be tested.

Future experiments will also lead to improvement of the play-out engine. For the level-crossing example, quite simple models are sufficient. In future, we will apply the play-out engine to more complex scenarios. This induces several research questions, for example, whether the control strategy is applicable to environment objects with a higher degree of freedom (e.g., steered vehicles) and whether the play-out can benefit from a larger prediction horizon. Furthermore, for more complex models, a sensitivity analysis (Sobieszczanski-Sobieski, 1990) shall be carried out. In the current implementation, the pseudo-metric and time scaling intervals need to be hand-crafted by the engineer according to the scenario. Because not every pseudo-metric leads to a correct play-out, this requires a deep understanding of the scenario and the play-out approach. For future versions, we will investigate into an automation of this step, based on the TSC formal semantics. This will drastically improve the usability

while ensuring both correctness and maximum flexibility during test case execution.

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