

# RESILIENCE MONITORING OF FUTURE SECTOR-COUPLED ENERGY SYSTEMS

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


DLR



Project ReMo-Digital, FZK 03EI1020B

# Context: Part 1

## Energy system optimisation



Typical scope of REMix models



Check out the open source REMix framework here :



Legend

Model region	Converter	Source	Gas	per unit activity
Gas transfer	Storage	Sink	Electricity	per unit built
Electricity transfer	Indicator		CO <sub>2</sub>	per flow
			Stored Li-Ion	per indicator

# Context: Part 2

## Approach for resilience monitoring




Context  
Scenarios




**Energy systems optimisation**



Stress Cases



Comparative metrics /  
indicators



## HOW IS IT DONE?

# Context Scenarios\*



## Descriptors




Electrification

RE-Expansion

Grid expansion

Decentralization


Energy imports




\* Formulated by ZIRIUS, applied by us

Madhura Yeligeti, DLR-Institut für Vernetzte Energiesysteme, 12.11.2024

# Stress cases: extreme event impact



## Stress cases: extreme event impact




# Energy system modelling




## REMIX model scope

- **Spatial:** DE (NUTS2), neighbouring countries (NUTS0)
- **Temporal:** 2050
- **Technological:**
  - Electricity and gas networks
  - Electricity + heating + H<sub>2</sub>/CH<sub>4</sub>
  - + flexible battery vehicles, demand response (Germany)
  - Brown-field optimisation





**Stress case as exogenous input to REMIX - time profiles of outages**

# Stress case impact and storyline: State-funded cyber attack



# Stress case impact and storyline: Snowstorm and dunkelflaute






# RESULTS AND OUTLOOK

# Energy System Design

## Germany 2050




# Energy System Design

## Germany 2050




H2 - annual balances of 2 scenarios for DE



# Scenario Elec-HighRE at the time of state-funded cyber attack


11<sup>th</sup> Aug – 24<sup>th</sup> Aug



# State-funded cyber attack – scenario Elec-HighRE


11<sup>th</sup> Aug – 24<sup>th</sup> Aug

- event impacting ~253 GW of PV capacity in DE



# Scenario H<sub>2</sub>-Import at the time of state-funded cyber attack


11<sup>th</sup> Aug – 24<sup>th</sup> Aug



# State-funded cyber attack – scenario H<sub>2</sub>-Import


11<sup>th</sup> Aug – 24<sup>th</sup> Aug

- event impacting ~159 GW of PV capacity in DE




# Scenario Elec-HighRE at the time of dunkelflaute

01<sup>st</sup> Feb– 15<sup>th</sup> Feb




# Dunkelflaute – scenario Elec-HighRE

01<sup>st</sup> Feb– 15<sup>th</sup> Feb




# Scenario H<sub>2</sub>-Import at the time of dunkelflaute

01<sup>st</sup> Feb– 15<sup>th</sup> Feb



# Dunkelflaute – scenario H<sub>2</sub>-Import

01<sup>st</sup> Feb– 15<sup>th</sup> Feb



## What can we deduce from our tests so far?



- Widespread weather events risk supply security drastically
- Loss of power generation capacity is more severe than loss of transfer capacity
- Extreme weather events have higher impact in scenarios with higher electrification
- Decentralised options fail to offer security in the case of large and long-lasting extreme events like a dunkelflaute
- Fallback options to revive security:
  - More back-up power generators (gas turbines, nuclear power, hydropower, ..)
  - Demand-shedding/hybridisation in industry sector (including electric boilers)
  - Wider network infrastructure (e.g. across the EU)

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