## RISK-DRIVEN TESTING AND CERTIFICATION IN SIMULATED ENVIRONMENTS

Prof. Dr. Michael Felderer Institute of Software Technology German Aerospace Center (DLR)


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UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE



















# Testing and Certification are Key in Safety-Critical Domains







## **Topics at the Institute of Software Technology**



# Dependable, Safe and Secure Software Systems Artificial Intelligence High Performance Computing and Quantum Computing Image: Dependable, Safe and Secure Software Systems Image: Dependable Software Systems Image: De


## Human-System-Interaction and Visualisation



#### Software and Systems Engineering



#### **Digital Twins and Digital Platforms**







#### Testing Collaborative AI Systems in Simulated Environments

#### Simulation Software as Research Software

Risk-driven Certification in Simulated Environments





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#### Simulation Software as Research Software

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## Human AI Collaboration (in Space)





**Space Station** 





Mars Base

## **Collaborative Artifical Intelligence System (CAIS)**




A Collaborative Artificial Intelligence System (CAIS) involves multiple agents, in this case, machine equipped with human-like abilities e.g. vision sensing, and humans working together to achieve common goals, improving efficiency and outcomes in complex tasks.







Testing ML model in real or simulated environment ML model tested as a unit in closed loop mode




## **Testing in Simulated Environments**



Simulation/Simulated Environments (simulators) are computer program environments that allow imitation of real-world processes/systems under controlled conditions

- Types are for instance
- software-based simulations
- physical mockups, or
- virtual reality environments














## **Simulated Environment**





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


Non-trivial implementation of an industrial collaborative system simulation



## **Simulation Process**





## **Application of Simulations**



- Robotics and Manufacturing: check computer vision, reinforcement
  learning
- Autonomous Driving: test lane keeping capabilities, object detection, maneuvering
- Software Development: identifying bugs, and ensuring software stability
- Medical Device Development: simulating patient interactions, evaluating device performance
- Aviation Training: practice emergency procedures in a safe, simulated environment
- Cybersecurity: identify vulnerabilities in network systems
- Aerospace Engineering: simulation of flight behavior

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## **Issues of Simulated Environments**



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Developing simulation models requires expert knowledge

#### Restrictions of simulation environments

#### 3

Simulation results may be difficult to interpret

#### 4

Modelling and analysis can be time-consuming

#### 5

Simulation is resource-intensive and often requires HPC

Simulation is expensive and benefits from a risk-driven approach driving scenario selection

## **Additional Testing Challenges**



#### 1


Representative test cases covering failure diversity



Unpredictable behavior of agents at runtime

#### 3

Identification of critical and meaningful assurance cases



Risk-driven and search-based approach to testing and test case diversity analysis in simulated environments offer promising solutions to these challenge




Risk-driven testing aligns testing activities with the real-world constraints which

Identifies potential weaknesses and failure points in a system.

Analyzes the likelihood and severity of each risk.

Prioritizes testing efforts to focus on high-risk areas.

## **Risk Assessment and Risk-Based Testing**



Probability of failure / hazard

Impact of failure / hazard





Jubril Gbolahan Adigun, University of Innsbruck Matteo Camilli, Free University of Bozen–Bolzano Michael Felderer, University of Innsbruck and Blekinge Institute of Technology Andrea Giusti, Fraunhofer Italia Research Dominik T. Matt, Free University of Bozen–Bolzano and Fraunhofer Italia Research Anna Perini, University of Trento Barbara Russo, Free University of Bozen–Bolzano Angelo Susi, Fondazione Bruno Kessler

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Adigun, J., Camilli, M., Felderer, M., Giusti, A., Matt, D., Perini, A., Russo, B., Susi, A. (2022) Collaborative AI Needs Stronger Assurances Driven by Risks. Computer, 55(3), IEEE

## **Underlying Publications**



2023 IEEE 34th International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE)

## 🝰 💿

#### Risk-driven Online Testing and Test Case Diversity Analysis for ML-enabled Critical Systems

Jubril Gbolahan Adigun\*⊥♠, Tom Philip Huck<sup>¶</sup>, Matteo Camilli<sup>†</sup>, Michael Felderer<sup>\*‡§</sup> \* University of Innsbruck, Austria Email: {first}.{last}@uibk.ac.at ⊥ Ainnov& Technologies Ltd, Nigeria Email: jubril@ainnov8.com Center for Artificial Intelligence (AI) Research Nepal, Nepal Email: jubril.adigun@cair-nepal.org Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany Email: tom.huck@kit.edu <sup>†</sup> Politecnico di Milano, Italy Email: matteo.camilli@polimi.it <sup>‡</sup> German Aerospace Center (DLR), Germany Email: michael.felderer@dlr.de <sup>‡</sup> University of Cologne, Germany Email: michael.felderer@uni-koeln.de


Adigun, J., Huck, T., Camilli, M., Felderer, M. (2023) Risk-driven Online Testing and Test Case Diversity Analysis for ML-enabled Critical Systems. ISSRE 2023, IEEE

## **Industrial Robot Safety**




STOP STOP STOP


(a) Safety-rated monitored stop



(c) Speed and separation monitoring



(b) Hand guiding




(d) Power and force limiting


ISO 10218 and ISO/TS 15066 which specify risk management processes for robots and robotic devices and safety requirements for industrial robots and collaborative industrial robots define four collaborative operating modes

> Our work is based on the Safety-rated monitored stop operating mode

Risk assessment to deal with ML and related risks in CAIS not considered in current standards like ISO 10218 or ISO/TS 15066




## **Hazard Identification**






## **RiskML Metamodel**





## **Risk-driven Online Testing**







We defined an optimization problem using different metaheuristic optimizing search algorithms to drive tests

- Random Search (RS) as a baseline
- Genetic Algorithm (GA)
- Evolutionary Strategy (ES)
- Simulated Annealing (SA)

Algorithm	Configuration parameters			
GA	Polynomial mutation probability 0.143 and DI 100.0, Binary crossover probability 0.9 and DI 100.0			
ES	Polynomial mutation probability 0.143, Elitist option <i>true</i> , $\lambda = 20, \mu = 20$			
SA	Temperature $T_0 = 1.0$ , Min temperature 0.000001, Temperature variation coefficient $\alpha = 0.95$ , Polynomial mutation probability 0.143			





## Define fitness function to derive test outcome $\forall t \in T, \forall p \in \mathcal{S}(r_t, s_t), ||h_t - p|| > 0$

## **Optimize search**

$$f(\omega) = \min_{t \in T, p \in \mathcal{S}(\omega, r_t)} \|\omega h_t - p\|$$

 ${\cal T}$  is observation period,

 $\|\cdot\|$  is the magnitude of the distance between locations in the (3D) collaborative space,  $r_t$ , is the location at time t of the robot,  $h_t$  are locations at time t of the human,  $s_t$  is the speed of the robot at timet, and  $\omega$  is simulation status

## **Research Questions**



RQ1: What is the effectiveness of the risk-driven test case generation across different search strategies? We compared the effectiveness of the metaheuristic optimizing search algorithms against the baseline random search using statistical significance test and effect sizes

### **RQ2: What is the diversity of generated test cases causing hazards?**

We applied cluster analysis using DBSCAN, dimension reduction with PCA and then diversity validation using Local Interpretable Model-agnostic explanations for Local Explanation Diversity (LED) measure

#### **RQ3: What are the most important domain features?**

We applied Shapley Additive Explanations (SHAP) feature importance explainer then developed a feature score ranking matrix to determine the average contribution of each feature

#### Note:

- We had **20** simulation "runs" relating tests resulting from a particular algorithm configuration
- Per run: 400 evaluations (an instance of a concrete scenario)

## **Results – RQ1 (Effectiveness of Test Case Generation)**




→ ES\_Fail

- SA Fail

--- GA Fail

-X- RS\_Fail

Grouped boxplot for Fail evaluations for GA, RS, ES and SA



GA, ES, SA found more failed test cases respectively compared to RS

Also, GA showed the highest peak when all runs are considered


Distribution of number of fail evaluations per simulation run

Groups		Mann-Whitney U-test		$\hat{A}_{AB}$ effect size	
A	B	U statistic	<i>p</i> -value	estimate	magnitude
GA	RS	353.0	0.000	0.88	L
ES	RS	400.0	0.000	1.0	L
SA	RS	374.0	0.000	0.94	L
GA	ES	168.0	0.394	0.58	S
GA	SA	142.0	0.119	0.64	Μ
ES	SA	251.5	0.168	0.63	S

 $H_0$ : A and B are extracted from the same distribution (Null);  $H_1$ : A and B are extracted from different distributions (Alternative). *p*-value: 0.05 to reject  $H_0$  /accept  $H_1$ 

L - large, M - medium, S - small effect

### **Results – RQ2 (Diversity of Generated Test Cases)**



(b) Intra- and inter-cluster diversity



Even though **GA** yields more failures in general, both ES and SA lead to more clusters (more diversity).

Algorithm	<b>#Clusters w/o PCA</b>	<b>#Clusters w PCA</b>	<b>#PCA components</b>
ES	75	82	2
SA	69	67	2
GA	55	54	2
RS	1	1	2

(c) Clustering with and without dimension reduction

# **Results – RQ3 (Importance of Domain Features)**




Rank (1st — 7th)					
Feature	ES	SA	GA	RS	<b>Overall score</b> $\downarrow$
robot speed	1	2	2	1	1.5
robot wait time	3	4	1	3	2.75
human wait time	4	3	3	2	3.0
human speed	6	1	4	4	3.75
diffuse light (R)	6	5	6	5	5.5
diffuse light (B)	5	6	5	7	5.75
diffuse light (G)	7	7	7	6	6.75

Robot speed has the highest importance, followed by *human speed*, *robot wait time* and *human wait time*. The three diffuse light features are generally of lower importance,

Implication - the ML visual perception component is fairly robust to changes in the lighting condition.

### Further Challenge: Understanding Hazards via Decision Trees and Rule Extraction





	rule example #	illuminance (lux)	domain features operator arms color (R,G,B)	operator position (x,y)
_	11	<100		
1	2	>100	R >220, G >236, B >200	x >180, y >10






#### Testing Collaborative AI Systems in Simulated Environments

#### Simulation Software as Research Software


Risk-driven Certification in Simulated Environments

## Modeling and Simulation Software (1/2)





## Modeling and Simulation Software (2/2)



### **Embedded Control Software**








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٢	process getLaserCurrent out readTemp out tempSens out readA out readB pattern w 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 pattern w 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 pattern w 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 pattern w 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1	
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### **Software Prototypes in Engineering Research**



Modes

Default SafeMode Science



AOCS->powerAvgTota

Propulsion->powerAvgTotal

Structure->powerAvgTotal

Power->powerAvgTotal O Communication->powerAvgTotal O AOCS->powerAvgTotal

Propulsion->powerAvgTotal 
DataHandlingSystem->powerAvgTotal

» AOCS

A Propulsion

a Structure

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
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### **Infrastructure and Platform Software**





# **Empirical Investigation on Research Software**




#### Software Development at the German Aerospace Center: Role and Status in Practice

Lynn von Kurnatowski German Aerospace Center (DLR) Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany lynn.kurnatowski@dlr.de Tobias Schlauch German Aerospace Center (DLR) Braunschweig, Germany tobias.schlauch@dlr.de Carina Haupt German Aerospace Center (DLR) Berlin, Germany carina.haupt@dlr.de

The diversity of research focuses is also reflected in the programming languages that are used. The most frequently used programming language is Python with about 23%, followed by C++ with about 14%, MATLAB with about 12% and C with about 11%.



Research software (and in particular simulation software) is a critical artifact that requires software engineering







#### Testing Collaborative AI Systems in Simulated Environments

#### Simulation Software as Research Software


**Risk-driven Certification in Simulated Environments** 


# **Virtual Product House (VPH): Overview**




Multidisciplinary DLR research collaboration

- Aerodynamics
- Aeroelastics
- Software
- Structure
- Systems
- Objectives
  - Virtual Aircraft Development & Evaluation
  - Reduce physical tests
  - Improvements in aircraft emissions
  - Virtual Certification








### **Virtual Product House (VPH)**

### **Simulations for Virtual Tests available**





### **Requirements in Aviation** Source: CS 25, European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)



"The aeroplane [...] must be designed [...] so that [...]

- Any catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable; and does not result from a single failure; and
- Any hazardous failure condition is extremely remote; and [...]

For each catastrophic failure condition that results from two failures [...] it must be shown that [...]

• The sum of the probabilities [...] does not exceed 1/1000"

### **Requirement: Minimize risk of failure**

#### Requirements in Aviation Status Quo





- Design and build prototype
- Test on purpose-built test rig
- Measure effects of failures
- Calculate risk of failure conditions

#### Pro

- Accepted by community
- Accepted by authorities
- Decades of experience


#### Cons

- Expensive in money and time
- Long feedback cycles



### **Future Vision** Fully risk-driven certification






Now: Conservative Airplane Design driven by Top-Down Waterfall Process Future: Risk-Driven Agile Airplane Design

# Virtual Product House

**Contribution to Aircraft Lifecycle** 


- Phases considered
  - Digital Design
  - Virtual Manufacturing
  - Virtual Testing
  - Virtual Certification
- Research topics
  - Simulation and validation
  - Virtual certification
  - Uncertainty quantification and robustness



### Virtual Product House Virtual Design

- Digital aircraft (component) design process
- Input: Initial design of aircraft component
- Output: sized component structure ("As designed")






### Virtual Product House Virtual Manufacturing




- Gives a physical model at state "manufactured"
- Enables considering manufacturing related deformations
- Strength distribution for virtual tests






# **Virtual Product House Virtual Testing** HLCC DLR **Co-Simulation** $\checkmark X$ Aulti purpos Airbus

### Virtual Produce House Validation







#### 60

#### Virtual Product House Results so far

Results so far

- Automated simulations of design, manufacturing, testing
- Validated simulations by comparing with actual production and testing
- Fidelity deemed sufficient via realworld comparison

### Benefits

- Fewer prototypes, reduced cost
- Shorter feedback cycles


### Future Work and Research

- Development and design process
- Uncertainty quantification
- Resilience
- Validation
- Credibility for authorities



### Software Testing at VPH Current Status


- System under test: Software tool chain
  - ~10 discipline-specific tools
  - pre- and postprocessing for each tool
- Quality assurance for whole system via ad-hoc, manual testing






### Software Testing at VPH Requirements

- No codified, testable requirements
  - Input: Wing model
  - Output: Modified wing model
- Acceptance criteria
  - practical knowledge of Subject Matter Expert (SME)
  - similarity to previous results



### **Software Testing at VPH** Future Vision

- Testing goal: Find wing model where output becomes implausible for SME
- Intermediate goal: Construct set of edge case wing models
  - Find reasonable parameter space (length, width, shape, no. of flaps, ...) with SME
  - Use SME as binary oracle, perform random search
  - Use SME as gradient oracle, let feedback guide search
  - Use SME to provide training data for AI-SME
- Major issues:
  - Single execution currently takes long
  - SME feedback not necessarily consistent







### **Uncertainty Quantification**

• Estimate the error range, handle uncertain data, and quantify fidelity of the simulation, application of AI to increase fidelity

Resilience


• Apply simulation to unvalidated input parameters and the whole range within the validated design space

### Validation

• Correctness of the simulation and behavior of the digital twin in relation to the real world phenomenon

## Credibility for Authorities

• Trustworthiness of the whole process





- [1] Adigun, J., Camilli, M., Felderer, M., Giusti, A., Matt, D., Perini, A., Russo, B., Susi, A. (2022) Collaborative AI Needs Stronger Assurances Driven by Risks. Computer, 55(3), IEEE
- [2] Adigun, J., Huck, T., Camilli, M., Felderer, M. (2023) Risk-driven Online Testing and Test Case Diversity Analysis for ML-enabled Critical Systems. ISSRE 2023, IEEE
- [3] Felderer, M., Schieferdecker, I. (2014) A taxonomy of risk-based testing. International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer, 16(5), Springer
- [4] Kurnatowski, L., Schlauch, T., Haupt, C. (2020) Software Development at the German Aerospace Center: Role and Status in Practice. ICSE (Workshops) 2020
- [5] Mischke, R., Schaffert, K., Schneider, D., Weinert, A. (2022) Automated and Manual Testing in the Development of the Research Software RCE. ICCS 2022, Springer

### **Call for Papers**

Volume 212 June 202





#### The Journal of SYSTEMS and SOFTWARE



### Special Issue on: Automated Testing and Analysis for Dependable Al-enabled Software and Systems

#### **Guest editors**

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#### Submission Deadline: August 31, 2024





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