SAFE MODULAR ONLINE UPDATES AND UPGRADES FOR MIXED-CRITICALITY SYSTEMS

Gregor Nitsche, Patrick Uven, Ingo Stierand, Kim Grüttner

31. SafeTRANS Industrial Day, 28.11.2022 Berlin





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Your system is up to date Android version: 7.1.2 Security patch level: May 5, 2017


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ightarrow Check for update

New functionalities Latest version Security patches **Bug fixing**



- Connected devices are vulnerable to cyber-attacks
- Security mechanisms become obsolete over time
 - New vulnerabilities disclosed every day
- Updates are crucial to guarantee security (patching)






 Machine Learning is becoming more important and thus the integration with a feedback and update process though MLOps







- Security demands frequent / critical updates
 - Over-the-air (OTA) updates
- Functional Safety and OTA updates
 - Safety lifecycle (V-model) for critical SW development
 - Trust level increases with service time
 - Modifications are discouraged
 - Standards require an impact analysis, new safety validation, re-certification

Challenges

End-to-end Security

Challenges

End-to-end Security

Safety

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Challenges

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End-to-end Security

Safety

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HW/SW complexity

SOLUTIONS AND OBJECTIVES




Safe and secure update framework

Contract-based design

Observability and Controllability

Solution: A holistic OTASU paradigm




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Solution: A holistic OTASU paradigm







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Solution: A holistic OTASU paradigm







Safety & Security Assessment




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


















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Update design and development

Update

deployment



7.4.2.4 The design method chosen shall possess features that facilitate software modification. Such features include modularity, information hiding and encapsulation. *IEC-61508-3*

Contract – formalized description of the conditions of integration (real-time, resources, functionality, safety aspects)

Resource- & Metadata (RMD):

Update

CYCLE

- System-Configurations
- Resource Usage
- Interference upper-bounds
- Power Supply
- Temperature

Update desing and

development

Monitoring

UP2DATE update compatibility is defined by:


- \rightarrow Mutual satisfaction of resource- and metadata-requirements
- \rightarrow Refinement of (implicit) resource-limits and metadata-criteria
- \rightarrow Mutual satisfaction of timing-requirements
- → Refinement of timing-specifications




Functional Event Timing (FET):

- Absolute & relative timing of functional events (i.e., control-/data-flow-events)
- Regularity & variance of functional-event timing (i.e., period, delay, jitter,)


Update design and development



System and app characterization (contract specification)




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
System bus (CAN, TCP/IP, etc.)

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
Pandora FMS





















Compatibility is:

- based on components & composition
- a relation between components

Def:

- Components are compatible, if they
 - 1. don't harm each other and
 - 2. cooperate (interact) as intended



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Components don't harm each other iff:

- a component's assumptions are not violated by its environment
- the component's guarantees don't lead to violated assumptions within its environment

→ Check satisfaction between assumptions and (composed) guarantees

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intended !

M_{Sys}

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
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C_{Svs}

Sub

changing a

component


means


changing the

system

intended?

M_{Sys2}






Monitoring

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Conclusion and open challenges

- Proof-of-concept modular update process and middleware (server to gateway to enddevice)
- Contract based compatibility checking and online monitoring promising approach
- No functional (SOTIF) properties considered so far
- Only static resource properties supported so far
- Interference challenge on shared resources still not sufficiently solved
 - Today's COTS HW still not designed appropriately (see "CAST-32A" and "AC 20-193" for Avionics Multi-Core Processing)
 - Multi-Core Processing Platform with robust partitioning required
 - Robust Resource and Time Partitioning not only between software applications hosted on the same core, but also between applications hosted on different cores of an MCP or between applications that have threads hosted on several cores
 - Joint HW/SW approach required for partitioning hypervisor with guaranteed robust partitioning
 - Our contract based approach would highly benefit from such robust partitioning, since it allows
 - to exploit the power on incremental update compatibility checking
 - and a shift towards virtual verification



Contact info & credits

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
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