

Exploring long-term strategies for the German Energy Transition - A Review of Multi-Sector Energy Scenarios

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Abstract

This article systematically compares 26 different scenarios of climate-friendly energy systems, aiming at a reduction of CO₂ emissions of at least 90% for Germany in 2050. Technical strategies in terms of technology or energy carrier mixes in the end-use sectors industry, buildings, and transport as well as in the conversion sectors are examined. In addition, the consequences of those different strategies in terms of electricity demand, installed capacity for electricity generation, demand for synthetic fuels and gases (P2X), etc. are looked at. Furthermore, imports of electricity and P2X are compared. In conclusion, there is a wide range of transformation pathways that are projected for Germany, and there is far from consensus on how to technically achieve a reduction in CO₂ emissions of at least 90% by 2050 in comparison to 1990 levels. This, in turn, illustrates that there is still much need for research and discussion to identify feasible and sustainable transformation strategies towards a “net zero” energy system for Germany.

Keywords: Energy system analysis, German energy transition, Scenario modeling, Scenario comparison

1. Introduction

2 The energy transition towards low carbon emissions, or even carbon neutrality, requires
3 highly ambitious strategies to change the way we generate and use energy. Views and expect-
4 ations of energy experts varies widely regarding the future structures of energy systems and the
5 technologies required for ensuring a sustainable, efficient, and secure energy supply. The broad
6 analysis and assessment of possible options and alternatives is usually done by means of quanti-
7 tative scenarios. For decades, such model-based studies have been an established instrument to
8 inform decision-makers about possible pathways, options and their effects [1].

9 Given that the multitude of scenarios presented so far (here for the case of Germany) have
10 been constructed on the basis of different methods, and taking different assumptions on future
11 technological, societal, and other developments, it is neither surprising nor problematic that the

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12 technical decarbonization strategies and the calculated values, e. g., for installed capacities of
13 various energy generation and storage technologies, differ across scenarios. Nonetheless, the
14 analysis of their commonalities and major discrepancies can provide valuable insights into what
15 can be considered as a scientific consensus and which questions seem to be the most difficult to
16 answer and require further research.

17 In this paper, we provide an overview of scenarios formulated by expert groups in 15 studies.
18 All of them have been widely discussed in the public debate on the energy transition in Germany.
19 This may mean that they were commissioned and published by government institutions (such as
20 the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy) or by influential industry asso-
21 ciations and received corresponding attention, or that they were produced by renowned research
22 institutions whose publications were carefully registered and discussed within the research com-
23 munity, but also by the general public. The technical decarbonization strategies in the different
24 sectors were analyzed according to their main distinguishing features. Our focus is on studies
25 that look far into the future of the year 2050, which is associated with great uncertainties and,
26 thus, rather large differences between the studies.

27 We identified the most important scenario studies that cover all areas of final energy demand,
28 i. e., including freight and passenger transportation, process heat and space heating. Our analysis
29 follows the research goal to identify robust findings from the scenario projects, which are all
30 differently designed and implemented. We do not seek to quantify the influence that individual
31 methodological choices, assumptions and data inputs have on the scenario outcomes. In prin-
32 ciple, such an in-depth analysis can only be carried out by the institutions originally involved,
33 which have access to all the models and data used for scenario development. Given the high het-
34 erogeneity in the quantitative presentation and documentation of scenarios, and different levels of
35 transparency of the underlying modeling [2, 3], it is not possible to identify causal relationships
36 between the model inputs and the quantitative outcomes as, e.g., in [4]. Instead, differences and
37 commonalities in the scenario study approaches are qualitatively analyzed and presented here.
38 The comparative presentation of the formulated decarbonization strategies is given in the form
39 of quantitative results for shares of different technologies in different application sectors.

40 Scenarios are not predictions, but they describe possible developments of the future that
41 arise under certain boundary conditions ("what if...?"). A special type of scenarios are norma-
42 tive scenarios that describe possible paths toward a given goal. The scenarios examined here all
43 belong to this second type of scenarios. Depending on the study, the goals are either to reduce
44 all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or only energy-related CO₂ emissions (which account for
45 the majority of GHG emissions) by at least 90%. Although the targets, system boundaries, and
46 assumptions may vary from study to study, all of the selected scenarios describe transformation
47 pathways for the full energy system (including transportation), and they all have the primary
48 focus to describe a future energy system is either carbon neutral or has at least a high level
49 of greenhouse gas emission avoidance. In this respect, despite the differences between the ap-
50 proaches, the comparison of the studies' results for the energy system yields important insights
51 that can help guiding the transformation process.

52 On the one hand, the analysis helps to identify those structural features of a future largely
53 climate-neutral German energy system on which there is broad agreement within the scientific
54 community. On the other hand, it also identifies those sectors and structural elements for which
55 very different decarbonization strategies are still proposed. Here in particular, the analysis then
56 highlights further research needs in order to identify more clearly which strategies are associated
57 with which technical, economic, ecological and social advantages and disadvantages. Thus, the
58 analysis can make an important contribution to the discussion about the concrete design of the

59 energy transition in Germany. The novelty of the analysis lies on the one hand in its scope and
60 focus on scenarios for the entire energy system, and on the other hand in the fact that the aim
61 is not a comparison of models and an understanding of the results, but a comparison of results
62 that illustrates in particular uncertainties and research needs in decarbonization strategies for the
63 German energy system.

64 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses other meta-studies
65 on energy scenarios, and shows how this work contributes to the scientific debate. In Section 3,
66 the criteria for selecting the scenario studies analyzed here are presented. Section 4 provides the
67 results of the scenario comparisons, at the level of their different methods used and regarding
68 the outcoming technical decarbonization strategies. Section 5 discusses and Section 6 finally
69 concludes the findings.

70 2. State of research

71 There have been numerous meta-studies and comparisons of scenarios describing a future
72 energy system with different thematic and geographical scope. For example, at a global scale,
73 Loftus et al. analyzed 17 scenarios for decarbonizing the energy sector, and compared them
74 according to a set of empirical benchmarks, which they took as an indicator for the feasibility
75 of the suggested scenarios [5]. By comparing the rate of change in energy and carbon intensity
76 and low-carbon technology deployment rates implied by each scenario with historical experience
77 and industry projections, they find that all of the scenarios envision historically unprecedented
78 improvements in energy intensity. They also find that most studies focus on decarbonizing the
79 power sector, while the industrial and transportation sectors are not specified in detail.

80 Cochran et al. looked at twelve scenario studies with very different national to global scopes,
81 focusing on high renewable penetration scenarios for the power sector [6]. They compare the
82 chosen approaches, data inputs, results, and policy implications. They come to the conclusion
83 that the technology mix for highly renewable energy scenarios varies considerably regionally
84 and globally. Jenkins et al. provide an overview of 40 studies that vary in geographic coverage
85 up to the global level. They selected studies that feature at least one scenario in which CO₂
86 emissions are reduced by more than 80% below contemporary levels [7]. The review focuses on
87 the electricity sector, and their geographic scope was national in the majority of cases (mostly
88 USA). The authors derive the most important challenges for achieving zero carbon emissions in
89 the electricity sector on the basis of the main scenario statements.

90 There are also numerous meta-studies of national scenarios for individual countries world-
91 wide; we can only mention a few exemplary ones here: Kwon and Østergard [8] look into three
92 studies for Denmark, all of them describing a 100% renewable energy system. They compare
93 the chosen assumptions and methods in two of the three studies in detail and show that the main
94 differences lie in the assessed biomass potential, in development paths in transportation, and in
95 the future power grid, which is only treated explicitly in one of the models. Another interest-
96 ing meta-study applying a novel systematic method can be found for the Swiss power system in
97 2050 from Densing et al. [9]. They followed a four-step mixed qualitative/quantitative analysis
98 by carrying out a taxonomy of modeling approaches, a principal component analysis of scenario
99 results using a distance measure, an evaluation of extremality of a scenario, and finally a selec-
100 tion of a representative set of scenarios [9]. With the taxonomy, they tried to make the influence
101 of methods and scopes on the results more transparent. The study shows that policy decisions to
102 support or phase out nuclear power, to develop centralized thermal versus distributed renewable
103 generation, and to allow net electricity imports versus largely domestic generation are the three

104 principal components of the scenarios. However, another important conclusion was that “the
105 proposed meta-analyses cannot substitute knowledge of the individual scenarios”. Deason [10]
106 compares different national scenarios for 100% renewable energy power systems. He screened
107 45 studies of different geographical scope, and selected eight of them for a further detailed anal-
108 ysis by comparing results of flexibility demand, variable power generation and power generation
109 costs. The results show different strategies and technologies to provide flexibility in the future,
110 and that dispatchable capacities are expected to still play an important role in the long term.

111 There are also several studies that put their focus on the analysis of German energy transition
112 scenarios; however, most of them considering only the electricity sector. Schmidt et al. reviewed
113 ten scenarios for the year 2050 that are in line with a target share of renewable energy in the
114 electricity share of 80% [11]. All of them exploit the three basic options of increasing domestic
115 renewable power generation, reducing electricity demand and importing renewable electricity,
116 but to substantially different extents. With the goal to make future electricity system scenarios
117 better comparable, Lunz et al. conducted a survey of 18 power system studies with 62 different
118 scenarios for Germany in 2050 [12]. 29 scenarios were further analyzed in detail. Out of these,
119 eight scenarios were selected to be illustrative for specific characteristics (e. g., business as usual,
120 ambitious climate protection including carbon capture and storage (CCS), climate protection with
121 >80% renewable energy share, and others), and a ninth, self-defined scenario representing a share
122 of >100% fluctuating renewable energy. They present a method for increasing the comparability
123 of the scenarios by recalculating the amount of required supplementary technologies providing
124 flexibility to the system in a uniform way. Their model also considered the potential of power-
125 to-heat and demand-side management to provide flexibility to the power system.

126 There are far fewer studies that examine German transformation scenarios across all sectors
127 in detail. For instance, Keles et al. reviewed four scenario studies with a time horizon of 2030,
128 which they claim to be representative for the three groups of (international) scenarios that they
129 identified and labeled as “moderate”, “climate protection” and “resource scarcity and high fossil
130 fuel prices” [13]. They defined a fourth scenario group that they identify as necessary in the
131 German context, which considers nuclear energy as an option for the future.³ A study with
132 a similar scope to this work has been conducted by Ruhnau et al. [14]. They reviewed 22
133 scenarios for Germany 2050 with a specific focus on decarbonization of heat generation and
134 road transport. They particularly compare the two strategies of direct and indirect electrification.
135 Their study provides relevant insights, for example the range of expected additional electricity
136 demand for heating and road transport, and the share of electrified supply in these two sectors.
137 It is, however, limited to these questions and does not discuss the full range of aspects in the
138 scenarios’ technical decarbonization strategies.

139 In addition, there is a larger body of gray literature (not peer-reviewed) that compare scenar-
140 ios for Germany under different aspects, such as development paths in transport or the possible
141 future role of biomass use and synthetic gases, e. g., [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24].

142 The difference and novelty of this study compared to the existing literature is that it focuses on
143 multi-sector energy scenarios for Germany which aim to reduce energy-related CO₂ emissions
144 by at least 90%, in line with the goals of a largely climate neutral energy system in 2050. In
145 this way, it is possible to analyze a number of key cross-sectoral aspects, such as the change in
146 electricity demand due to different electrification strategies. By looking at the same geographical
147 scope (Germany), the differences between the scenarios in terms of final energy consumption as

³Their study was published before the decision to phase out nuclear power generation in Germany.

148 well as fuel and technology shares in the sectors can be more consistently attributed to different
149 decarbonization strategies and represented strategies.

150 **3. Method**

151 In the following, the criteria for selecting the scenarios for this review (Section 3.1), and the
152 approach for the systematic scenario comparison are described (Section 3.2).

153 *3.1. Scenario selection*

154 Many energy system scenarios for Germany in 2050 have been formulated in the literature.
155 Several of the corresponding scenario studies have been carried out by larger research consortia,
156 and were funded by federal ministries, agencies, or industry federations. They gather diverse
157 expertise from well-established research institutes and scholars, and have received a lot of atten-
158 tion. This work focuses on such larger scenario studies, as they have high relevance in policy
159 making and scientific debates alike. Table 1 gives an overview of the scenarios included in this
160 meta-analysis. They were selected according to the following criteria:

- 161 • Geographical focus: Germany;
- 162 • Coverage of entire energy supply system (power generation, heat supply, P2X, as well as
163 documentation of transportation technologies);
- 164 • At least 90% reduction of Germany’s CO₂ emissions until 2050 (compared to 1990), in
165 agreement with national goals [25, 26]⁴;
- 166 • Sufficiently detailed documentation of the scenario results.

167 Our scenario review also included studies that aim at an emission reduction between 80% and
168 90% (see Supplementary Material). It shows that these do not simply differ gradually in their
169 share of deployed technologies; instead, completely new technologies enter the scene with higher
170 CO₂ reduction. In particular, power-to-X (P2X, X: heat, gas, or liquid) for air traffic and heavy-
171 duty vehicles as well as for (high-temperature) process heat generation becomes much more
172 relevant. Also, flexibility options in the electricity sector (e. g., storage) are over-proportionally
173 needed due to the higher shares of intermittent renewable power generation. This makes a com-
174 parison of >90% reduction scenario particularly interesting, as the proposed solutions show a
175 larger diversity than the 80% scenarios.

⁴Note that Germany has further tightened its climate protection targets since the study was completed. With the June 2021 amendment to the Climate Protection Act, Germany is aiming for climate neutrality in 2045 [27].

Table 1: Scenarios analyzed in this work

Author(s) / institution(s)	Funding agency	Year	Scenario name	Abbreviation (study-scenario)	Ref.
DLR, FhG IWES, IfNE	BMU	2012	A	BMU12-THG95	[28]
UBA	UBA	2014	THGND	UBA14-THGND	[29]
Nitsch	BEE	2014	100%	NIT14-100	[30]
Öko-Institut, FhG ISI, Ziesing	BMUB	2015	Klimaschutzszenario 95	BMUB15-KSSz95	[31]
FhG ISE		2015	90/ambit./Mix/beschl.	ISE15-90-amb-mix-b	[32]
Greenpeace		2015	PLAN	GP15-PLAN	[33]
Ifeu, FhG IWES, CONSIDEO, Dr. Schoer SSG	UBA	2017	GreenEe	UBA17-GreenEe	[34]
Enervis energy advisors	INES, BWE	2017	Maximale Elektrifizierung Optimales System	INES17-ME INES17-OS	[35]
Jacobson et al.		2017	100% wind, water, and solar	JAC17-WWS	[36]
BCG, Prognos	BDI	2018	95%-THG-Minderung	BDI18-95	[37]
EWI Energy Research and Scenarios	dena	2018	Elektrifizierung 95% Technologiemix 95%	dena18-EL95 dena18-TM95	[38]
Nitsch		2019	Klima-19-OPT	NIT19-OPT	[39]
FZJ		2019	95%	FZJ19-95	[40]
UBA	UBA	2019	GreenEe1 GreenLate GreenEe2 GreenMe GreenLife GreenSupreme	UBA19-GreenEe1 UBA19-GreenLate UBA19-GreenEe2 UBA19-GreenMe UBA19-GreenLife UBA19-GreenSupr	[41]
FhG ISE		2020	Referenz Inakzeptanz Suffizienz Beharrung Referenz 100	ISE20-REF ISE20-INAKZ ISE20-SUF ISE20-BEHARR ISE20-REF100	[42]

176 *3.2. Scenario comparison*

177 The quantitative scenario comparison focuses on the year 2050. It is based on published data,
178 which is taken either from reported tables or from figures, and, in a few cases, from the study's
179 main text. In the cases of [28, 30, 32, 43, 42], additional data were made available by the study
180 authors.

181 The scenario comparison adheres as far as possible to the definitions of sectors, technologies,
182 and fuels in the original studies. However, the technological granularity in a given sector may
183 differ from study to study. For example, some studies only document the shares of electric
184 vehicles in general. Other studies clearly distinguish between battery electric vehicles (BEV),
185 plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV), cp. Figure 6.
186 Furthermore, the definition of sectors is not uniform throughout all studies. This implies that it
187 was not possible to develop a uniform analysis structure for all studies and all scenarios.

188 In order to keep most of the original information, own calculations were avoided wherever
189 possible, except for the simple calculation of totals, shares, etc. However, in some cases, ad-
190 ditional assumptions were necessary to obtain a more complete picture. These calculations are
191 documented in the Supplementary Material.

192 The “technological decarbonization strategies” as defined here describe technical options to
193 provide useful energy in the end use sectors, and to generate secondary energy carriers in the
194 conversion sector. In the end-use sectors, the technological decarbonization strategies describe
195 strategies to provide low temperature heat for space heating and hot water, and process heat
196 to residential, industrial and commercial consumers. They also show technological options for
197 power trains and fuels for road passenger and freight transport, aviation, navigation, and rail
198 transport, respectively. In the conversion sector, the decarbonization strategies describe options
199 for generating electricity and district heat. For the purpose of this study, the “technical decar-
200 bonization strategies” are identified as the shares of particular technologies and/or energy carriers
201 in the end use and conversion sectors analyzed.

202 In addition, it is worth looking at cross-cutting or aggregating sector aspects, such as the
203 demand for electricity in different applications, the use of biomass, or the role of power-to-gas
204 (P2G) and power-to-liquid (P2L) in the different sectors.

205 **4. Results**

206 A review of the methods applied for the scenario construction in the selected studies is dis-
207 cussed in Section 4.1. More specifically, the assumptions made for the emission reduction paths
208 are laid out in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, the main technical decarbonization strategies in the
209 analyzed scenarios are compared. Section 4.4 compares the resulting power demand, installed
210 capacities for power generation, consumption of synthetic fuels and gases, and biomass as well
211 as the final energy demand per sector.

212 *4.1. Methods applied in the scenario creation*

213 The analyzed scenario studies apply a variety of methods for defining the proposed energy
214 systems in 2050. All scenarios build on model-based assumptions on the future (final) energy
215 demand in the main sectors electricity, heat and transportation. These are formulated on the basis
216 of various bottom-up models. Capital vintage models that assume an initial stock of, e. g., build-
217 ings or vehicles, and consider replacements with more efficient units at the end of their lifetime,
218 are widely used for several demand categories. For other residential, TCS (trade, commerce, and

219 service), and industrial demand categories, specific energy intensities (e. g., per employee, per
 220 m², or per monetary unit of value added) are used for demand projections. For drafting the technical
 221 decarbonization strategies that make up the scenarios, three general approaches have been
 222 identified: accounting frameworks only, accounting frameworks combined with power market
 223 simulations, and integrated models that apply some form of optimization approach to find the
 224 least-cost system that meets the emission targets and all other imposed constraints. Figure 1
 225 shows which study belongs to which of these three rough categories.




Figure 1: Classification of the scenario studies considered according to the methods used, the definition of the emission target, and the scope of analysis.

226 *Accounting frameworks* allow modeling the energy system according to a normative scenario
 227 technique that produces consistent scenarios in line with politically stated goals (e. g., regarding
 228 emission targets or targeted energy consumption reduction). NIT14 and NIT19 used the accounting
 229 framework ARES/SZENAR, which models consistent renewable energy supply quantities
 230 and the overall energy system. For UBA14 and UBA17, no specific method is mentioned; different
 231 potentials are estimated, and a consistent and secure energy supply is argued from external
 232 studies. No dispatch model is used in these studies for the power sector. The system behavior of
 233 the scenario formulated in UBA17 has been evaluated with the system dynamics model GEE(R)
 234 – Globale Erneuerbare Energie und Rohstoffe, for determining the resource requirements and
 235 energy-related GHG emissions over the course of time.

236 *Accounting frameworks with power plant dispatch* use additional power sector models for
 237 verifying that demand and supply of electricity can be matched in every hour of a year, and that
 238 enough reserves ensure the security of supply. In this category, the larger part of the transition
 239 pathways comes from explorative scenario creation methods using expert judgements. In the

240 cases of Jac17, BDI18, and dena18, some technology expansion decisions, especially for storage
241 capacities, come from the power sector model as a result of an optimization procedure; these are
242 then closer to the integrated modeling approach, and therefore depicted between the second and
243 third method class in Figure 1. In BMU12, the ARES/SZENAR scenarios were validated with a
244 linear programming based cost minimizing energy system model. In GP15, INES17 and BDI18,
245 power market models (EuroMod, enervis and Prognos, respectively) are used for calculating the
246 plant dispatch. Those power market simulation models follow the merit order principle. In the
247 Prognos model used in BDI18, parts of the expansion decisions are made endogenously based
248 on calculated power market prices. In Jac17, the LOADMATCH grid-integration model [44]
249 serves the purpose of obtaining low-cost plant dispatch and also the sizes of installed capacities
250 for storage and demand-response. In the dena18 study, the DIMENSION+ model is used, which
251 simulates the European power market. The model determines installed capacities of power plants
252 and storage units, and models plant dispatch and flexibility deployment.

253 *Integrated (optimization) models* derive the main scenario characteristics from the outcomes
254 of one or several integrated energy system models. These typically calculate the cost-optimal
255 investment and divestment pathways and the plant dispatch in all time intervals, usually in hourly
256 time resolution. In that optimization, CO₂ or GHG reduction targets are typically formulated as
257 constraints that must be satisfied, in the same way as other technical constraints imposed for
258 the individual technologies. Among the optimization methods, linear programming (LP) and
259 mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) is most popular. This was applied by UBA19 with
260 the cross-sectoral dispatch and expansion model SCOPE. BMUB15 applied the LP/MILP model
261 PowerFlex for plant dispatch, and linked it with electricity import and export time series from
262 the agent-based simulation model PowerACE; the capital vintage simulation model ELIAS was
263 used for calculating decommissioning of old and (lowest cost) investment into new power plants,
264 and also linked to PowerFlex. FZJ19 used FINE – Framework for Integrated Energy System
265 Assessment, which is an MILP model, but also provides the option to model nonlinear (quadratic)
266 investment cost functions; it is an open-source model. The scenarios in ISE15 and ISE20 were
267 calculated with the integrated model REMod – Regenerative Energien Modell that consists of
268 two components, i. e., a yearly dispatch model and a transformation pathway component for
269 investment decisions. This model is not an LP model, but uses meta-heuristics to find the optimal
270 solution (particle swarm optimization in the case of ISE15, and covariance matrix adaptation -
271 evolution strategy (CMA-ES) for ISE20).

272 In addition to the general methods, some studies include statements on the system costs
273 associated with the assumed scenarios, such as in ISE15, ISE20, INES17 and dena18. These
274 studies sum up investment and operation costs of all identified technologies, and compare the
275 overall costs across several scenarios. The two studies BMUB15 and BDI18 further model the
276 macro-economic effects associated with the scenario realization in a broader scope, and quantify,
277 e. g., effects on the gross domestic product or on employment within the country of Germany. To
278 this end, they apply general equilibrium models and input-output tables [45] that can account for
279 inter-sectoral feedbacks resulting from the policy measures driving the scenarios. In BMUB15,
280 the models used for this are ASTRA-D and FARM-EU, and in BDI18, the model VIEW by
281 Prognos AG is employed. Figure 1 visualizes the consideration of this additional economic
282 dimension by vertical bars representing the respective scenario study.

283 To some extent, the studies examined here assume very different developments in socio-
284 economic driver variables (see Figure 2): Estimates of the annual average change in Germany's
285 population range between an annual decrease of 0.2% and 0.4%. The gross domestic product
286 (GDP) is expected to increase between 0.2% and 1.0% per year, gross value added (GVA) be-




Figure 2: Drivers and intensities: Average annual change (GDP: gross domestic product, GVA: gross value added, FEC: final energy consumption)

287 tween 0.7 and 1.2%. Estimates of the annual change in the passenger transport service range
 288 between an average *decrease* of 0.5% and an *increase* of 0.6%, for freight transport between a
 289 *decrease* by -0.2% and an *increase* by 1.6%. Note that not all studies report those quantities (see
 290 gaps in Figure 2).

291 The classification of the studies' methodological approaches is no statement about their re-
 292 spective quality or validity. Integrating more aspects or applying more models does not neces-
 293 sarily raise a scenario's quality. After all, each modeling team had to find a suitable compromise
 294 between the scope and level of detail on the one hand, which quickly raises a model's complex-
 295 ity, and the traceability and comprehensibility of the results on the other hand, allowing to derive
 296 meaningful conclusions and cause-effect relationships. The fact that the study approaches are
 297 quite diverse makes a comparison of their results even more interesting.

298 4.2. Scopes of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets

299 At the level of emission reduction goals, the scope of sectors that can contribute to either
 300 CO₂ or GHG emissions varies, too. In Figure 1, these sectors are visualized along the ordinate.
 301 None of the scenario studies reviewed here considers full life-cycle emissions, but only direct
 302 emissions that occur during the plant operation. On the one hand, this is a severe limitation as
 303 huge investments are assumed for the envisioned future energy systems, which then also imply
 304 additional emissions from the construction of those plants. On the other hand, "prospective"

305 life-cycle assessments of far-future energy scenarios are challenging due to open methodological
306 questions and limited data availability [46, 47].

307 Another commonality across studies is that they apply the sources principle, which is con-
308 sistent with internationally applied emission accounting procedures. The source principle states
309 that emissions are reported where they occur and are accounted for within the national borders of
310 a country. Consequently, emissions from aviation and navigation are mostly considered only for
311 domestic traffic and international transport that departs from Germany. Not all studies describe
312 exactly how they account for aviation and navigation, however.

313 The purely energy-related studies in this review either only consider an emission reduction
314 goal for the energy domain, or they calculate mitigation targets that remain after exogenously
315 defined *residual emissions* from other sectors have been subtracted from the overall emission
316 target or budget. Some of these studies provide explicit information about these other sectors
317 and the assumed emission paths (e. g., GP15, dena18 and ISE15).

318 Three studies consider either feedstocks or process emissions or both, in addition to energy-
319 related emissions. Feedstocks are non-energy uses of fuels that are nowadays obtained from
320 fossil resources, and that need to be substituted by renewable sources for decarbonizing the econ-
321 omy. Feedstocks are explicitly considered in INES17, a study that focuses on renewable gases
322 and was funded, among others, by a federation of gas storage operators. Another important
323 source of emissions are those from industrial processes. dena18 only formulates gross pathways
324 for feedstock and process emission developments along the transformation scenarios. In that,
325 different scenarios within the study assume different rates of substitution of conventional pro-
326 cesses (e. g., for the production of steel, aluminium, copper, cement, glass, ceramics, paper, and
327 chemicals). FZJ19 only makes assumptions for alternative technologies to avoid process-related
328 CO₂ emissions in the steel and cement production, as these are the major emitters.

329 Five studies also include the agriculture sector (esp. fertilization and animal husbandry), or
330 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). BDI18 name emissions from
331 fermentation in digestion, fertilizer usage, agricultural land usage, liming, urea application, and
332 those related to energy plant fermentation as emission categories explicitly modeled. Besides,
333 they consider emissions from waste management, fugitive emissions and emissions from mili-
334 tary, process emissions from mineral and metal processing as well as chemical industries, and
335 emissions from the use of non-energy products made from fuels and solvents, from the electron-
336 ics industry, from substitution products for ozone depleting substances (ODS) and from other
337 processes (e. g., nitrous oxide in medicine). Similarly broad is the range of emissions modeled
338 by BMUB15 and the UBA studies (UBA14, UBA17, UBA19), but these also modeled LULUCF
339 emissions and formulated scenarios for different developments of these. This involved, for in-
340 stance, that less animals, less fertilizer usage, and also less agricultural area was assumed to be
341 used in the 95% GHG mitigation scenarios.

342 4.3. *Technical decarbonization strategies in the energy sectors heat in buildings, process heat,* 343 *transport, power and district heat generation*

344 The following sections describe the technical decarbonization strategies analyzed in this re-
345 view: decarbonization strategies for low temperature heat generation in buildings (Section 4.3.1)
346 and process heat generation (Section 4.3.2), power train technologies in individual road passen-
347 ger transport (Section 4.3.3) and in road freight transport (Section 4.3.4), the technology mix
348 in power generation (Section 4.3.5), the role of imports of power and synthetic gases and fuels
349 (Section 4.3.6), and finally technological options for district heat generation (Section 4.3.7).

350 If no values are shown for a scenario in the following figures, this means that the study in
351 question does not make any statement on the variable shown in the figure.

352 4.3.1. Low-temperature heat in buildings

353 The fuel resp. technology shares for space heat and hot water in buildings is shown for the
354 selected scenarios in Figure 3. The main strategies to provide low-temperature heat space heat
355 and hot water in buildings are shown in Figure 3. Most studies suggest one of the following
356 two strategies: **Electric heat pumps as the dominant heat source**, as documented by the high
357 shares of environmental energy in, e. g., FZJ19-95, ISE15-90-amb-mix-b or UBA17-GreenEe, or
358 **district heat as the dominant heat source**⁵, which is advocated in BMU12-THG95, NIT14-100,
359 NIT19-OPT. Only two studies consider natural gas from fossil and synthetic origins as relevant
360 contributors to low-temperature heat provision, namely dena18-TM95 and ISE20-BEHARR.

361 In some scenarios, gas (and even oil) boilers are still used to provide space heat and hot
362 water. However, as they use an increasing share of synthetic methane as fuel (e. g., dena18-
363 EL95, dena18-TM95, BDI18-95, UBA14-THG95), their emissions of fossil CO₂ are low.

364 Solar thermal energy plays a (minor) role in only a few scenarios. Its share in the provision
365 of space heat and hot water does not exceed 14% in any of the scenarios. Many studies avoid the
366 use of biomass in the building sector altogether. At most, 15% of space heat and hot water in the
367 building sector are provided by biomass (BMUB15-KSSz95).

368 A radical solution is proposed in JAC17-WWS, which assumes 100% electrification of the
369 heat demand in buildings. However, it is not clear which technology (electric heat pumps, electric
370 resistance heaters, or other solutions) is assumed to be applied here.

371 4.3.2. Process heat generation and industrial energy demand

372 Fuel shares for process heat generation are documented only for a few scenarios (Figure 4).
373 Strategies are more diverse for process heat provision than for low-temperature heat (Section
374 4.3.1). **Electricity** is an important source in all but one scenario (ISE15-90-a-mix-b), contribut-
375 ing 25 to 45% of the process heat. Different from the low-temperature heat strategies, all sce-
376 narios that report on process heat in detail consider **biomass** as an important contributor, with
377 shares between 10% and 43%. The three scenarios that had the highest district heat shares for
378 low-temperature heat, BMU12-THG95, NIT14-100, and NIT19-OPT, also assume considerable
379 contributions from **district heat** for process heat, which are in the order of 24 to 30%. Synthetic
380 gases (partially) replace natural gas in all scenarios but BMU12-THG95 with shares between 8%
381 and 23%. Solarthermal shares mostly lie between 5% and 12% (exception: FZJ19-95).

382 Process heat accounts for approximately two thirds of the industry's energy demand in Ger-
383 many [48]. Therefore, an analysis of the final energy demand of the industrial sector also allows
384 conclusions to be drawn on the underlying strategies of process heat supply in those scenarios
385 which do not explicitly report details on process heat. However, the different system boundaries
386 (industry vs. processes) of the various studies make it difficult to accurately compare the under-
387 lying decarbonization strategies. In these scenarios, **electricity** is a far more prominent solution,
388 contributing at least 30% in all, and more than half the industry's energy demand in some sce-
389 narios. The second most important source of energy supply in all scenarios of UBA14, UBA17
390 and UBA19 is **synthetic methane**. Besides, many studies see hydrogen as an important source,
391 with contributions in the order of 5 to 30%. Biomass plays an important role only in one scenario

⁵For details on energy carriers used to generate district heat, see Section 4.3.7.




Figure 3: Fuel shares in final energy demand in buildings (low-temperature heat for space heat and hot water) in 2050 (residential buildings and trade, commerce, services (TCS), and industry). Letters f, b and s indicate energy carriers of fossil, biogenic or synthetic origin. DH, EH, ST is the sum of district heat, environmental heat and solar thermal energy.




Figure 4: Fuel shares in final energy demand for process heat in 2050 in the selected scenarios.




Figure 5: Fuel shares in final energy demand in the industry sector in 2050. Letters f, b and s indicate energy carriers of fossil, biogenic or synthetic origin. DH, SH, EH is the sum of district heat, solar thermal heat and environmental heat.

392 (BDI18-95, with 34%). Solar thermal energy is not considered in any of the industrial energy
393 supply portfolios in Figure 5.

394 It is notable that BMUB15-KSSz95 and BDI18-95 still assume significant coal usage in the
395 industry in 2050. This is mainly due to the difficult substitution of coal with less carbon intensive
396 energy carriers, for example in the blast furnace process. The fact that both studies consider GHG
397 emission reductions beyond energy-related emissions (cp. Figure 1) can explain the difference
398 to other scenarios, which do not have coal in their mixes, probably because they neglect process
399 emissions.

400 Looking at Figures 4 and 5 together, it can be seen that biomass is expected to continue to
401 play a role in providing industrial process heat in the future in most scenarios. However, the
402 extent of biomass use for industrial process heat is still unclear.

403 In general, the studies reviewed elaborate on the fact that different industrial processes require
404 heat at quite different temperature levels. Especially for the high-temperature range, renewable
405 heat sources such as solar thermal energy, heat pumps or even (solid) biomass are not considered.
406 In the future, it would be important to focus more on the required temperature levels in scenarios
407 for the decarbonization of industry.

408 4.3.3. *Power train technologies individual road passenger transport*

409 The shares of different power trains in the total passenger car fleet in 2050 is illustrated in
410 Figure 6. As expected, the passenger car fleet is dominated by **electric vehicles** – either battery
411 electric vehicles (BEV), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), or fuel-cell electric vehicles
412 (FCEV) in almost all scenarios. In those scenarios which still rely on (non-hybridized) internal
413 combustion engines (ICE), they play only a comparably small role, with shares less than ca. 20%.
414 Only ISE10-BEHARR is an exception here, with still half of the passenger vehicles driven by
415 ICEs. Some scenarios further assume a shift towards gas motors in the ICE segment. However,
416 many studies assume a complete phase-out of pure ICE vehicles until 2050.

417 Four of the analyzed scenarios assume a share of BEVs of 100% in the passenger car fleet.
418 The role of FCEVs is seen very differently in the various scenarios: While some scenarios expect
419 a share of FCEVs of roughly a third of all passenger cars in 2050 (FZJ19-95, NIT19-OPT), other
420 scenarios assume that FCEVs will not penetrate the passenger car market at all.

421 The remaining ICE vehicles in 2050 may use biofuels and/or synthetic fuels in addition (or as
422 an alternative) to fossil fuels. Unfortunately, the blending quota for both biofuels and synthetic
423 fuels are rarely documented in detail in the studies. Sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.2 provide an overview
424 of the use of bioenergy and synthetic fuels (and gases) in the scenarios.

425 4.3.4. *Power train technologies (road) freight transport*

426 The scenarios report on power train technologies for freight transport in different ways. Some
427 provide numbers for all as a sum of road, rail, air and seaborne transports (or a subset). Others
428 specify each mode individually. Moreover, some studies report the shares of different vehicle
429 technologies, others report the shares of energy carriers used. In Figure 7, only results from
430 studies that provide the energy mixes for road transport are depicted.

431 It can be observed that **hydrogen (used in fuel-cell electric vehicles)** is an important source
432 or technology across scenarios. Only BMUB15-KSSz95 and GP15-PLAN do not report any
433 hydrogen use for freight transport. Besides, **electrification** of light and heavy-duty vehicles is a
434 prominent decarbonization strategy. This can be in the form of battery-electric vehicles or trolley
435 trucks.




Figure 6: Shares in power train technologies for passenger cars in 2050 in the selected scenarios.

436 If one includes the studies that report on vehicle shares, the general observation from all
 437 studies is that **more diversity in power train technologies** used in 2050 is assumed, as opposed
 438 to the strong homogeneity in today's technologies, i. e., largely building on fossil-fueled ICEs.
 439 In most scenarios for 2050, a mix of electric, fuel cell, ICE (Diesel, methane) and hybrid trucks
 440 is assumed. Another commonality of all scenarios is that a strong **shift of freight transporta-**
 441 **tion from road to rail traffic** is assumed, because of the higher efficiency and the much easier
 442 electrification of freight transportation.

443 Regarding the more specific question of the role of **trolley trucks** in future energy scenarios,
 444 there is no consensus, but a tendency towards an increasing importance of this technology for
 445 freight transportation. Some studies do not specify the (direct) electric power train technology at
 446 all, and of those who do, only FZJ19 argues that trolley (and also BEV) trucks will not be part
 447 of the power train mix due to too high cost. BMUB15 and BDI18 report considerable shares of
 448 trolley trucks in their scenario(s), and dena18, ISE20, UBA14, UBA17 as well as UBA19 argue
 449 that trolley trucks, along with BEVs, can play an important role for reducing CO₂ emissions in
 450 road freight transport.




Figure 7: Fuel shares in freight transport in 2050 in the selected scenarios.

451 4.3.5. Technology mix power generation

452 It does not surprise to see that **onshore and offshore wind** as well as **photovoltaic (PV)**
 453 **generation** form the backbone of future power generation in all scenarios (see Figure 8). These
 454 technologies produce at least 72% (BMUB12-THG95, NIT14-100) of Germany's electricity.

455 INES17-ME and INES17-OS even assume that no other technology will produce power. How-
456 ever, the relative shares of onshore and offshore wind as well as PV differ significantly across
457 scenarios.

458 The share of PV in the national power generation in 2050 ranges between 11% (BMUB12-
459 THG95) and 59% (INES17-OS), of onshore wind between 16% (ISE20-INAKZ) and 57% (UBA19-
460 GreenSupr) and that of offshore wind between 12% (INES17-OS) and 37% (BDI18-95).

461 It does not surprise that neither hard coal nor lignite fired power plants contribute significantly
462 to total power generation in 2050 (see Figure 8). Some other notable features of the analysis of
463 these scenarios are:

- 464 • **Gas-fired power plants** required for grid stabilization increasingly use hydrogen or syn-
465 thetic natural gas (BDI19-95, BMU12-THG95, dena18-EL95, dena18-TM95, FZJ19-95,
466 NIT14-100, NIT19-OPT, BDI18-95, and the dena18 scenarios). However, both INES17
467 scenarios and JAC17-WWS show no more gas-based electricity generation in 2050.
- 468 • **Geothermal power generation** is relevant only in BMU12-THG95, GP15-PLAN, NIT14-
469 100, and NIT19-OPT.
- 470 • **Biomass** plays only a minor role for power generation in all scenarios. Its share in total
471 power generation does not exceed 10% in any scenario, and is often explicitly used in CHP
472 plants.
- 473 • If reported explicitly, power generation in **CHP** plants (based on biomass, gas, or other
474 conventional energy carriers), contributes 15% or less to the total power generation.

475 According to German legislation, nuclear power generation will be phased out by 2022. Con-
476 sequently, neither of the studies assumes that nuclear energy will be part of the power generation
477 mix in 2050. Furthermore, no study includes the option of fossil power generation with CCS,
478 due to the lack of social acceptance in Germany.

479 *4.3.6. Import balance of electricity and synthetic gases and fuels*

480 According to the studies analyzed, Germany could become either a net importer or exporter
481 of electricity in 2050, depending on the scenario and assumptions around the development of the
482 European power system (Figure 9). Net power imports up to 270 TWh per year (967 PJ/a) and
483 annual net power exports up to 64 TWh (229 PJ/a) can be found in the studies.

484 Imports of synthetic fuels and gases (P2X) may become another important strategy to reduce
485 national GHG emissions: Assumed imports are largest in dena 18-TM95 (almost 2 700 PJ/a), but
486 also dena18-EL95, ISE20-BEHARR, ISE20-INAKZ and UBA17-GreenEe P2X assume imports
487 of more than 1 000 PJ/a in 2050 (Figure 9).

488 mports of biomass are rarely reported in the studies. Therefore biomass imports were not
489 included in this analysis.

490 *4.3.7. District heat generation*

491 In the studies evaluated here, the technical options to provide district heat vary strongly.
492 However, it has to be stressed that technologies and fuels/sources for district heat generation are
493 not documented in detail in many studies.

494 The scenarios put different emphasis on district heat for the heat supply in buildings and for
495 processes (see Figures 3 and 5). Figure 10, in turn, shows the scenarios' fuel shares in district




Figure 8: Technology shares in power generation in 2050 in the selected scenarios.




Figure 9: Power and P2X imports (negative values) and exports (positive values) in 2050 in the selected scenarios.

496 heat generation. BMU12-THG95, NIT14-100 and NIT19-OPT opt for important shares of both
 497 **fossil fuels and biomass used in CHP plants**, with additional solar thermal and, in two cases,
 498 geothermal energy. The fuel mix to provide district heat in ISE15-90-a-mix-b and BDI19-95 is
 499 rather broad. In the latter, “**surplus**” **electricity** plays a major role. While **solar thermal energy**
 500 is assumed to play a minor role in low temperature and process heat provisioning, there are two
 501 scenarios in Figure 10 that see a considerable fraction of district heat provided from that source
 502 (BMUB12-THG95: 19%, ISE15-90-a-mix-b: 32%).




Figure 10: Fuel shares in district heat generation in 2050. The white bars indicate that district heat is considered explicitly in the scenario, but no details on fuels are given.

503 4.4. Cross-cutting issues

504 In this section, the consequences of the reported technical decarbonization strategies for
 505 cross-cutting issues such as power demand and generation capacities (Section 4.4.1), the role
 506 of synthetic fuels and gases for heat and mobility (Section 4.4.2), the use of bioenergy (Sec-
 507 tion 4.4.3), and the final energy demand in all scenarios (Section 4.4.4) are compared.

508 The aspects examined here provide only some weak indications of possible consequences
 509 or risks of ecological and economic nature, resulting from the strong expansion of generation
 510 infrastructures (resource demand, land use, necessary investment, ...), for example for electricity
 511 generation and P2X, but also social aspects (e.g., social acceptance in the case of the envisaged
 512 strong expansion of onshore wind power). However, impact assessments were not in the scope
 513 of the scenarios analyzed here.

514 *4.4.1. Power demand, electrification and power generation capacities*

515 While all scenarios assume increased energy efficiency and, therefore, decreasing per unit
516 final energy consumption in general, the electricity demand in the scenarios is rather diverse.
517 Depending on the level of electrification, the power demand might strongly increase. Figure 11
518 illustrates the (gross) power demand in the scenarios. The differences between the scenarios also
519 reflect different estimates on the development of the useful energy demand in industry, house-
520 holds, and service, trade and commerce, as well as different estimates on the future passenger
521 and freight transport services. Wherever the information is provided, the conventional uses of
522 electricity are shown in the blue bars. Their differences are due to varying assumptions on the
523 population and economic development, technical efficiency gains, change in user behavior and
524 consumption patterns, etc. More important for the development of the power demand are dif-
525 ferent views on the future degree of direct and indirect electrification of the heat and transport
526 sectors, i. e., on the future role of power-to-heat (electric heat pumps, electric resistance heaters,
527 etc.), electric mobility (BEV, PHEV, trolley trucks, etc.), and P2X (H₂, CH₄, and synthetic liquid
528 fuels). Furthermore, the national power demand depends on assumptions on P2X imports (see
529 Section 4.3.6), as the electricity required for the generation of imported synthetic fuels and gases
530 is not included in the national electricity balance.

531 Estimates for Germany's power demand in 2050 range from 550 TWh per year (GP15-PLAN)
532 to nearly 2 000 TWh per year or more (INES17-OS, INES17-ME, JAC17-WWS). It should be
533 noted that in particular, dena18-EL95, dena18-TM95, ISE20-BEHARR, ISE20-INAKZ, ISE20-
534 REF100 and UBA17-GreenEe assume large P2X imports, which implies a higher overall power
535 demand than the national demand depicted in Figure 11.

536 The expected domestic installed capacities for power generation vary strongly between the
537 scenarios, cp. Figure 12. The lowest estimate is 284 GW overall (BMU12-THG95), and the
538 highest estimates is 1 309 GW (INES17-OS). This wide range is also reflected in the estimates
539 on the future deployment of wind onshore, wind offshore and PV generation capacity: Wind on-
540 shore ranges from 72 GW (BMU12-THG95) to roughly 230 GW (FZJ-95), offshore wind from
541 26 GW (dena18-TM95) to 124 GW (JAC17-WWS), and PV from 86 GW (BMU12-THG95) to
542 more than 1 000 GW (INES17-OS). Note that those scenarios with significant power and/or P2X
543 imports (see Figure 9) additionally require significant installations of (renewable) power genera-
544 tion technologies abroad to produce the respective energy exports to Germany.

545 The high capacities of intermittent power generation are expected to go hand in hand with
546 high storage demand. Unfortunately, storage demand is rarely reported in the studies, and can,
547 therefore, not reasonably be compared here.

548 *4.4.2. Synthetic fuels and gases for heat and mobility*

549 Figure 13 illustrate the demand for synthetic gases (H₂, CH₄) and synthetic liquid fuels in
550 the scenarios. Wherever possible, application sectors are differentiated. The data for these plots
551 had to be compiled from several sources in each publication (tables, figures, text). It can thus not
552 be guaranteed that the P2X demand is fully represented in the figure.

553 The total P2X demand is the effect of P2X strategies in different sub-sectors. For example, it
554 can comprise H₂ in FCEVs, synthetic CH₄ in gas motors, or synthetic liquid fuels as replacement
555 of fossil fuels in internal combustion engines in the transport sector. Both H₂ and/or CH₄ can be
556 fed into the natural gas grid, or used directly for heat generation or to generate power.

557 None of the highly ambitious scenarios can do without P2X, except for GP15-PLAN. Here
558 again, all scenarios assume that P2G or P2L is necessary at least in the transport sector, but also
559 for heat generation and/or as a long-term storage option for power generation. The absolute




Figure 11: Domestic gross power demand in 2050 in the selected scenarios.




Figure 12: Installed capacities for power generation (and storage, where available) in 2050 in the selected scenarios.

560 amount of P2X differs drastically across scenarios: Whereas BDI18-95, BMUB15-KSSz95, and
 561 JAC17-WWS assume that only between 140 and 500 PJ/a of P2X are required to almost com-
 562 pletely decarbonize the energy system, other scenarios assume a P2X consumption of 3 000 PJ/a
 563 and more in 2050 (dena18-TM95, ISE20-BEHARR).




Figure 13: Consumption of P2G (H₂, CH₄) and P2L in 2050 in the selected scenarios.

564 4.4.3. Bioenergy

565 The documentation of biomass use in the studies is very heterogeneous (Figure 14). Most
 566 studies assume a sustainable biomass potential between 1 000 and 1 600 PJ/a. Due to stricter
 567 sustainability criteria, UBA14, UBA17 and UBA19 assume significantly lower potentials. Also,
 568 the allocation of primary biomass to different conversion routes, e. g. power, district heat, bio-
 569 methane, biofuels, etc., or to end-use differs significantly.

570 Due to incomplete information given in the studies, the stacked bars in Figure 14 for GP15-
 571 PLAN and the INES17, UBA17 and UBA19 scenarios do *not* represent the full primary biomass
 572 potential.

573 4.4.4. Final energy demand

574 The final energy demand in the scenarios depends on assumptions regarding the development
 575 of different drivers like gross domestic product, population, or passenger and freight transport
 576 services. Furthermore, user behavior, modal split in the transport sector, and energy efficiency




Figure 14: Bioenergy uses in 2050 in the selected scenarios.

577 developments of end-use technologies play a role. Figure 15 summarizes the final energy demand
 578 in the sectors.

579 In the scenarios, estimates on the final energy demand in 2050 differ by almost a factor of
 580 two: Whereas lowest estimate for the final energy demand in 2050 is a bit below 4 000 PJ/a
 581 (BMUB15-KSSz95), the highest estimate is more than 7 800 PJ/a (ISE20-BEHARR). Estimates
 582 for the final energy demand in each sector differ by a similar order of magnitude across studies.
 583 As a reference, the final energy demand in Germany in 1919 was 9 050 PJ.

584 Figure 2 also summarizes the available information on the development of energy intensi-
 585 ties such as final energy consumption (FEC) per GDP, per GVA, or per capita. It illustrates
 586 that estimates on efficiency improvements in the enduse-sectors differ strongly between scenar-
 587 ios: The reduction of FEC per capita ranges between 0.5%/a (UBA19-GreenLate) and 2.0%/a
 588 (UBA19-GreenSupreme), FEC per GDP from 1.7%/a (UBA19-GreenLate) and 3.0%/a (UBA19-
 589 GreenLife).




Figure 15: Final energy demand in 2050 in the selected scenarios.

590 5. Discussion and caveats

591 The results presented in this work were compiled to the best of our knowledge. Neverthe-
592 less, there are a few points that should be considered when interpreting the results. First, the
593 quantitative analysis relies mainly on published tables and data read from figures. Only in a few
594 cases, explicit information from the study text was included. Thus, the analysis might not take
595 into account all the information available. Furthermore, data extraction from figures is prone to
596 errors. Besides, the reported scenario data is not always consistent. In a few cases, own assump-
597 tions were necessary (see Supplementary Material) in order to complete the published energy
598 balances. In some cases, the energy balances reported here are based on a compilation of several
599 sources within the original study (figures, tables, text).

600 The qualitative analysis of methods applied in the scenario creation is based on the study text.
601 It classifies the different approaches and models used, and demonstrates the various scopes and
602 definitions used in the scenario studies. This diversity makes the scenarios and the underlying
603 assumed transformation strategies less comparable. Each study is based on its own estimates
604 of driving factors, such as the development of economic indicators, population, living space,
605 transport services, etc. Furthermore, estimates of realizable increases in energy efficiency in all
606 sectors are different. The analysis here neglects the fact that there might be interdependencies
607 between, e. g., efficiency and technology options, or between economic development and tech-
608 nology innovation. For example, the efficient use of electric heat pumps in the building stock
609 requires the ambitious energetic renovation of most existing buildings, so the choice of a heating
610 technology is not independent of the advances in building energy standards.

611 The review in this work does not make a difference between older and younger scenarios.
612 The range of publication dates is 2012 to 2020. Reality has overtaken some scenarios already
613 today. Some scenarios discussed here have been updated on a regular basis, although with always
614 slightly changing focus, as it is the case for the series of BMUB12 → NIT14 → NIT19. This
615 means that the older scenarios not necessarily represent the best (or latest) state of knowledge on
616 possible transformation paths for Germany which is available today.

617 As a consequence of the approach followed here, the results presented in this study have to
618 be interpreted with caution. If further conclusions are to be drawn from this compilation, it is
619 preferable to refer to the original publication and to contact its authors for further information.

620 6. Summary and conclusion

621 The comparative scenario analysis provided in this work shows that there is by no means a
622 uniform picture of what a largely climate-neutral energy system for Germany in 2050 could look
623 like. The surprisingly little consensus, even in the most fundamental underlying estimates, such
624 as the final energy demand, reveals the high level of uncertainty involved in long-term scenario
625 modeling. What *is* certain, however, is that all formulated 2050 scenarios are fundamentally
626 different from today's energy system. While the generation technologies assumed, i. e., wind and
627 PV power plants, are available today, a nearly or fully carbon neutral energy system also relies to
628 a considerable extent on new, and in parts immature technologies. As their further development
629 – in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and cost – is difficult to estimate, their future deployment is
630 very sensitive to the assumptions made by the modelers. That, in turn, explains the large variety
631 of solutions presented in the studies.

632 We could show that the general methodological approaches of the reviewed scenarios are
633 quite diverse, ranging from accounting frameworks to integrated optimization system models;

634 they also address different scopes of greenhouse gas emission mitigation, ranging from only
635 energy-related CO₂ emissions to all greenhouse gas emissions related to energy and process
636 emissions, feedstocks, agriculture and even LULUCF. There are hardly any two models that
637 have the same combination of methodological approach and GHG reduction scope (see Figure 1.
638 Despite the differences, we were able to identify only a few technical decarbonization strategies
639 per sector. In some sectors, there is more clarity than in others. For example, all scenario
640 reviewed here assume passenger cars to be electrified for at least 80% of all vehicles. Among
641 the electric vehicles again, BEVs are the dominant solution, but FCEVs or PHEVs are also
642 considered in most studies.

643 Among the controversial aspects, from a technical view, the following questions are par-
644 ticularly noteworthy: What market share of and constraints for the deployment of electric heat
645 pumps, district heat and/or synthetic gaseous energy carriers can we expect for the provision of
646 space heat and hot water in the buildings sector? Will the industry sector primarily be decar-
647 bonized through direct electrification or via indirect route using hydrogen or synthetic fuels and
648 gases? What will be the share of FCEVs, BEVs, and PHEVs in the future passenger car fleet?
649 How can the road freight transport be decarbonized – via trolley trucks, FCEVs or synthetic
650 liquid energy carriers as a replacement of diesel fuels in ICEs? What amount of renewable elec-
651 tricity, synthetic gases and liquids will be imported? What are the ideal shares of PV, onshore
652 wind and offshore wind power plants in national power generation? Is there a role for bioenergy
653 in the future energy system, and if yes, where should it be used with priority?

654 The wide variation in strategies for these sectors indicates that more research is needed: On
655 the one hand, to better understand why different studies propose such different decarbonization
656 strategies for these sectors, it would be helpful to compare models and assumptions in detail.
657 This is a task that only the modelers of the original studies can undertake. On the other hand,
658 it may be interesting to conduct a comprehensive impact assessment to determine advantages
659 and disadvantages of different strategies not only on a technical-economic level, but also e.g.
660 regarding environmental impacts and social effects.

661 Furthermore, this analysis has also shown that many studies document both their assump-
662 tions and their results incompletely and in ways that make further work with the results difficult.
663 Therefore, it would be desirable for future scenario studies to have a minimum set of input and
664 result data that is made available to the scientific community in a machine-readable format. The
665 specifications and requirements of suitable data templates by public funding bodies, such as
666 ministries or agencies, could be helpful in this regard.

667 One other observation from the scenario comparison is that none of the studies, except for
668 FZJ19, are based on open-source models, or publish the input-data set used for parametrization.
669 Moreover, some of the models are poorly documented, i. e., no proper description of the method
670 and its implementation is available. As the resulting scenarios are targeted for influencing the
671 public debate on energy policies, this is a major concern, because the outcomes cannot be fully
672 replicated by other researchers.

673 All in all, the analysis shows that a systematic and detailed comparison of scenario data,
674 despite all difficulties regarding transparency and consistency, is suitable to examine to what ex-
675 tent there is a scientific consensus on key strategies for energy transition pathways, and what
676 quantitative differences exist. It also shows that there is still a great need for research on which
677 strategies should be pursued in order to achieve a climate-friendly energy system that is techni-
678 cally feasible, economically reasonable and socially and ecologically beneficial.

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