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1 **ABSTRACT**

2

3 Projections indicate that global transport may more than double by 2050. Future car stock and
4 use are of paramount importance for drafting policy measures and for assessing emerging
5 technology developments. This paper uses a unique forecasting approach combining quantitative
6 data and qualitative expert judgements. Based on the historic development of vehicle kilometers
7 traveled (VKT) in four OECD countries, the approach assesses potential future development
8 paths for BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and derives VKT
9 saturation levels for these. For this purpose, we investigated eight factors with influence on car
10 ownership and car use. A group of experts established factor values for the BRICS countries and
11 compared these to the factor values in the OECD countries. Subsequently, we linked the factor
12 values to levels of car use. Among the BRICS countries, we expect the lowest VKT saturation
13 levels for India and China, mainly but not exclusively due to their spatial structures and transport
14 policies. Spatial structures, socio-economic legacies and policies, among other factors, are
15 leading to higher expected VKT saturation levels in Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Those
16 countries also face challenges to establish alternatives to the private car.

17

18 **Keywords:** vehicle kilometers traveled, private car use, transport demand, BRICS countries,
19 emerging economies.

20

1 INTRODUCTION

2

3 The demand for passenger transport is expected to increase substantially as economic growth
4 continues in countries around the globe. Both, the International Transport Forum (ITF) and the
5 International Energy Agency (IEA) expect global passenger transport to more than double
6 between 2005 (ITF) or 2015 (IEA) and 2050 in baseline scenarios (ITF 2017, IEA 2009).
7 Despite such global estimates, specific projections of passenger transport demand for countries
8 worldwide are rare.

9 Projections of future car use, or more common future automotive energy use, are mostly based
10 on the development of population, income as proxied by gross domestic product per capita
11 (GDPpc) and costs for fuels and technology (compare e.g. WEC 2011, IEA 2016, ITF 2017).
12 Since data on vehicle kilometer traveled is rare, those models usually approach the energy
13 demand by estimating the number of cars and assuming their use.

14 Dargay et al. (2007) modeled the development of vehicle ownership rates based on historic
15 patterns for 45 countries. According to this data, car ownership exhibits a dynamic motorization
16 phase once income starts to rise, and levels off when a certain threshold of income has been
17 reached. This S-shaped curve and the tendency of saturation are visible for high-income
18 countries. Low- and mid-income countries may have entered the dynamic motorization phase,
19 but have not yet reached saturation.

20 These approaches for projecting car ownership and energy demand apply statistical modeling
21 and draw on quantitative data. One of the challenges of such methods is the lack of data and their
22 questionable comparability and reliability. In some cases (e.g. vehicle kilometers traveled)
23 desired data is missing completely for many countries, in other cases it follows non-uniform
24 standards, for example urbanization data by the United Nations. Another challenge of such
25 purely quantitative projections is differences in saturation levels that cannot be explained by
26 economic factors. Dargay et al. (2007) countered this by including factors for population density
27 and urbanization rates in the Gompertz function. An Australian approach integrated
28 unemployment figures into the modelling (BITRE 2012).

29 Against the observation that car ownership and car use cannot be explained by economic
30 parameters alone, Ecola et al. (2014) established an approach for deriving future levels of

1 passenger car use (labeled “automobility”) that combines both quantitative and qualitative
2 elements. They applied this approach in their study “The Future of Driving in Developing
3 Countries” (Ecola et al. 2014) for estimating future car travel in Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
4 This approach also builds on the S-shaped development of car ownership and a set of external
5 framework conditions define the automobility path for a specific country. The economic
6 development, however, is key to how rapidly the country proceeds on this path.

7 After five years, the paper at hand presents an update of this 2014 study. This follow-up study
8 broadened the first study: firstly, we applied updated statistics and integrated additional data;
9 secondly, we added South Africa to the list of countries to be examined. The update of the study
10 was conducted by a research team that was partly identical to that of the first study, and we
11 gratefully acknowledge the foundation that was laid by all authors around Ecola et al. (2014).
12 Both studies involved a largely identical group of international experts, who represented the
13 study countries and contributed to the assessment.

14

15 **DATA AND TRENDS IN FOUR OECD COUNTRIES**

16

17 Analogous to Ecola et al. (2014), we have selected four OECD countries (Australia, Germany,
18 Japan, and the United States) that represent the reference for the projection of automobility in
19 BRICS countries. Our reasons for the selection are: (i) all four countries have achieved a high
20 level of income, expressed as GDPpc, (ii) in all countries tendencies of saturation of
21 automobility are apparent, (iii) the countries are located on different continents and thus
22 represent a wide range of geographic conditions, and (iv) have different socio-economic and
23 cultural backgrounds. We thus draw conclusions from the development patterns in these
24 countries and extrapolate them to the BRICS countries. The plotting of VKT over GDPpc, using
25 Gompertz functions, reveals a good correlation between these two variables, but also shows the
26 different saturation levels not explained by GDPpc.


27 For the calculation of VKT, we applied a simple Gompertz function comparable to that of
28 Dargay et al. (2007):

29

$$VKTi = \gamma e^{-\alpha} e^{-\beta GDPi}$$

1 where γ is the saturation level and α and β are negative growth rates, defining the shape of the
 2 curve. Plotting modelled and observed VKTpc over GDPpc values (**Figure 1**) illustrates that the
 3 model maps the historic development reasonably well (estimated values γ , α and β and there
 4 standard deviation are presented in the appendix)..

5 **Figure 1 Development of VKT (A) over GDP per capita and (B) over time, based on real**
 6 **data (Data) and Gompertz function (Model). Own depiction. [online in color]**



7
 8 The update of the 2014 study results in slightly different automobility patterns for the four
 9 OECD countries compared to Ecola et al. (2014). Most notably are lower VKT saturation levels
 10 for all four OECD countries (values see **Table 1**). Our recalculations and updates are based on
 11 national and international statistical figures for GDP, GDP per capita (GDPpc) and car use
 12 (VKT, expressed as vehicle kilometers traveled per capita) up to the year 2017. Similar to the
 13 previous study, the most dynamic motorization period lies between 10 000 and 35 000
 14 US\$_{2011PPP} GDPpc¹.


¹ While Ecola et al. (2014) used the 1990 Geary-Khamis Dollar, we updated the GDPpc figures based on data by the World Bank (2019), which provides figures in 2011 International US Dollars, normalized to purchasing power parity (PPP). The absolute GDP values are thus higher than in the previous study.

1 **Table 1 Comparison of VKT saturation levels of the updated analysis compared to the**
 2 **former study (Seum et al. 2019)**

Country	VKT saturation levels [km per capita]	
	According to Ecola et al. (2014)	Study update 2019
Australia	10,800	9,900
Germany	9,700	8,500
Japan	6,400	6,000
United States	16,300	15,100

3
 4 Our update shows that the economic crisis in 2008/2009 has led to changes in the model fitting.
 5 With declining income, a reduction of VKT can be observed, except for **Germany**. Particularly
 6 the **United States** had seen a declining GDPpc, coupled with a decline in VKT. Since 2012,
 7 income and the VKT in the USA are increasing again. **Australia** and **Japan** also saw a decline in
 8 VKT during the recession years and both seem to have leveled off. In **Germany**, the recession
 9 had not dampened VKT, and the saturation level apparently has not been reached yet.

10 **Figure 2: Comparison of VKT data with Gompertz-calculated VKT data for Japan,**
 11 **years 1970 – 2020.** The squares highlight periods of economic recession with further increasing
 12 VKT according to statistical data [*online in color*]



13
 14 The Gompertz function for Japan predicts a continuously increasing VKT, even beyond 35 000
 15 GDP per capita and resulting in a saturation value of approximately 6 000 VKT However, from
 16 the year 2000 onward there were clear tendencies of VKT-saturation in Japan which are not

1 reflected well in the model prediction. Likely reasons for this are inadequate representations of
2 continued growth of VKT during previous times of economic recessions in the model, a time
3 trend independent from GDPpc growth (Figure 2) as well as inconsistencies in the Japanese VKT
4 statistics over time. While some continued growth of VKTpc for Japan seems likely, an increase
5 to 6000 km appears unlikely given the countries historic development relative to other countries.
6 Having to decide on a plausible saturation level for the next steps of the project, we opted for
7 4,500 km. This value is based on the future saturation rates of the other study countries and
8 Japan's position relative to these countries today

9

10 **METHOD OF THE FLAG-GAME APPROACH**

11

12 As stated above, our study combines statistical analysis with qualitative assessments. The main
13 reason behind this approach is that statistical figures on GDP and the demographic development
14 are not sufficient to explain the level of automobility in a country. Ecola et al. (2014) had
15 identified nine factors that characterize the future path of automobility. Out of these, we kept
16 eight factors in the study update to predict VKT. The ninth factor – domestic oil – was shifted to
17 a separate part of the analysis that addresses the evolution of propulsion technologies. This
18 second part, however, is not the subject of this paper.


19 The eight factors are:

- 20 • *Active population*: The share of the population at a stage in life that is characterized by
21 high mobility rates.
- 22 • *Domestic car industry*: The relevance of a *domestic car industry* for the national
23 economy.
- 24 • *Spatial dispersion*: The extent to which settlement patterns are conducive to automobility.
- 25 • *Car culture*: The country's affinity to cars from a socio-cultural perspective.
- 26 • *Car infrastructure*: The entire infrastructure for driving, including quality and quantity of
27 roads, parking, and level of service.
- 28 • *Inexpensive driving*: Low expenses for driving (including taxes) relative to income.
- 29 • *Pro-car policies*: Policies and legislation directed to promote car ownership and usage.

- 1 • *Lack of alternatives*: How car-focused the transport system in a country is, particularly
2 with regard to infrastructure available for other modes of urban and interurban travel.

3
4 For our analysis of the eight factors, we use indicators derived from statistics and combine these
5 with a qualitative assessment in a workshop format called “flag game”. The flag game was
6 conducted during a two-day workshop, held in October 2018, that brought together fourteen
7 experts, two from each BRICS country and one each for Australia, Japan, Germany, and the
8 United States (Kuhnimhof et al. 2014). Based on indicators and literature review, we compiled
9 brief fact sheets for each factor as input for the expert discussion. During the flag game, the
10 experts then determined the flag position of each country relative to the four OECD countries for
11 each factor (**Figure 3**). The method thus combines numeric information with judgement from
12 international experts with long histories of observing trends and developments. Relying on
13 expert judgement carries a burden of subjectivity (Niederberger & Wassermann 2015). However,
14 the use of expert judgement is common in policy consultations and an essential element of future
15 studies. Alcamo (2008) argues that pure quantitative approaches often provide a false sense of
16 the future due to the lack of exactness of numeric data. Furthermore, building on numeric data
17 predictions into the future contains many implicit assumptions as well (Alcamo 2008). In our
18 exercise of the flag-game we tackled the aspect of subjectivity in two ways: first, our selection of
19 experts relied on persons that dispose of significant contextual knowledge in the field of
20 transport development in their own, but also in other countries. Thus, our experts explicitly are
21 observers of a scientific field without personal interest in it (A comprehensive discussion on the
22 role of experts can be found in Niederberger & Wassermann 2015). Second, the positioning of
23 the flags was conducted in a consensual approach. Thus, while the aspects of subjectivity cannot
24 be removed from this approach, it is likely that a similar group of experts in the future would not
25 deviate drastically from the judgements made in our exercise. The following statements rest on
26 the discussions during the workshop. Following the Chatham-house rule, without attributing it to
27 a specific person. Other input is marked with a literature reference.

28



1
2
3 **Figure 3 Flag game results for factor *car infrastructure* as example. [online in color]**

4 The flag game visualizes for each factor, to which degree it encourages or impedes the
5 development of automobility. For each country two flag positions were established: the first
6 position indicates the factor situation at the early stage of motorization in the respective country
7 (approximately at 10 000 US\$_{2011PPP} GDPpc); the second position marks its situation at the point
8 in time, when the growth of automobility starts to level off (the saturation phase, approximately
9 at 35 000 US\$_{2011PPP} GDPpc). The national GDPpc levels are based on time series data for 1990–
10 2017 (Word Bank 2019), complemented up to 1990 by historical GDP values (Bolt et al. 2018)
11 and for the years 2017 onward by extrapolated data using GDP growth rates of an OECD model
12 (IIASA 2016). Since for all BRICS countries the beginning of the saturation phase lies in the
13 future, these flag positions relied on estimates of our country experts. We then converted the
14 flags' positions into a scale of values ranging from -2 to +2, where -2 correlates with impeding
15 and +2 with promoting automobility in a country.

16 In a second step, country experts were asked to judge the comparative weight of each factor with
17 regard to VKT. In the end, an automobility score (AS) is calculated for each country, as
18 weighted average of all eight factor scores. The AS serve as proxy to estimate the saturation
19 levels for VKT and car ownership for each country. Each participating expert could vote with a
20 weighting number one, two or three on the significance of each factor for VKT and car

1 ownership. The weighting was set comparatively. The final factor weight per factor represents
2 the simple average of all votes. There was a strong agreement particularly on the factors with
3 high weight: *urbanization* and *spatial dispersion*, *car infrastructure* and *lack of alternatives* as
4 well as on *active population* to have a strong influence on the VKT. The weightings for *domestic*
5 *car industry*, *inexpensive fuel* and *car culture* were definite, but with some spread, whereas the
6 impact of *pro car policies* for VKT was inconclusive. Whether the factor weighting have a
7 significant impact on the outcome will be discussed later.

8
9 **SUMMARY OF SELECTED FACTORS WITH HIGH INFLUENCE ON**
10 **AUTOMOBILITY**

11
12 **Table 2** lists all factor scores for the OECD and BRICS countries for the corresponding points in
13 time, where countries reached - or are projected to reach - 10 000 and 35 000 US\$_{2011PPP} GDPpc
14 levels. Highlighted are scores that represent the upper (green) or lower (red) 20% in each
15 column. Those for the points in time when the country is reaching the saturation phase of
16 automobility are highlighted in bold. The last row shows the weights assigned by the expert
17 panel to each factor with regard to VKT (the higher the score, the more in favor of automobility).

18

1 **Table 2 Factor scores and factor weights based on the flag game exercise for the beginning**
 2 **of the motorization phase and the beginning of the saturation phase. Factor weights are**
 3 **provided in the last row. [online in color]**

Country	Decade when GDPpc reached 10,000 and 35,000 US\$	Active population	Spatial dispersion	Domestic car industry	Car infrastructure	Lack of alternatives	Pro car policies	Inexpensive driving	Car culture
		Factor scores							
Australia	1930s	0.1	-0.8	-0.8	-1.2	0.1	1.2	0.5	0.4
	2000s	0.9	1.8	-0.1	1.4	0.9	0.6	0.9	0.3
Germany	1950s	-0.5	-1.3	0.9	-0.2	-0.9	0.1	-1.0	0.2
	1990s	0.4	-0.5	1.8	1.4	-1.5	-0.5	-0.3	-0.1
Japan	1960s	0.4	-1.8	0.7	-1.3	-0.8	0.5	-1.1	0.0
	2000s	0.0	-0.9	1.6	0.0	-1.5	-1.2	-0.2	-0.3
United States	1930s	0.4	-0.8	1.4	-1.1	0.1	1.8	1.3	1.6
	1980s	0.9	1.7	0.4	1.8	1.5	0.9	1.7	0.9
Brazil	1980s	0.9	-0.2	0.7	-0.5	-0.1	0.9	-1.0	0.3
	2050s	1.1	0.3	1.3	0.2	-0.4	0.6	-0.6	0.9
China	2010s	1.3	-1.7	0.4	-0.7	-0.5	-0.1	-1.0	-0.3
	2030s	1.5	-1.0	1.0	0.0	-1.7	-1.6	-0.6	0.6
India	2020s	0.6	-1.7	-0.2	-1.4	-0.1	0.3	-1.0	-0.5
	2060s	1.5	-0.9	0.7	-0.4	-1.5	-0.6	-0.6	0.2
Russia	1990s*	0.4	-1.0	-0.2	-0.1	-0.4	1.2	0.3	0.4
	2020s	1.0	-0.3	1.1	0.2	-1.5	0.5	-0.2	0.6
South Africa	2000s	-0.6	1.9	-0.8	0.2	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.8
	2050s	-0.3	1.4	-0.2	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.1	1.4
Factor weights for VKT		2.3	2.9	1.4	2.6	2.8	2.3	2.3	1.8

NOTE: * For Russia, the end of the Soviet Union – 1991 – is considered as starting point.

4
 5 As a general observation, the factors in favor of automobility dominate in the OECD countries
 6 compared to the BRICS countries. Only Japan shows impeding factors (i.e. scoring among the
 7 lowest 15%) that dampen automobility in the saturation phase. In Brazil, on the other hand, there

1 is hardly a dampening factor. Otherwise, for the BRICS countries dampening factors dominate.
2 In the following, we will highlight findings from the factors *spatial dispersion* and *lack of*
3 *alternatives*, the two with the highest factor weights, in more detail and summarize findings of
4 the others thereafter.

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
6 **Spatial dispersion**

7 *Spatial dispersion* in a broad sense refers to the spatial and sociodemographic structures in a
8 country. In contrast to Ecola et al. (2014), which used a single value of density in urban areas in
9 the year 2000, we drew from data of the Atlas of Urban Expansion (Angel et al. 2016) a time
10 series of densities of representative urban built-up areas in the study countries (**Figure 4**).

11 Furthermore, we used the share of the population living in cities with more than 300 000
12 inhabitants (UN DESA 2018) as a second indicator. The dataset provided by Angel et al. (2016)
13 on urban development has identified urban areas representative for geo-cultural regions for the
14 years 1991, 2000 and 2014, thus providing data that allows for the comparison of states and
15 regions and their development over time. The share of population living in cities with more than
16 300 000 inhabitants is better comparable than e.g. urbanization rates due to different national
17 definitions of the term “urbanization” (UN DESA 2018, p. 2).

18 Kenworthy (2018) found a strongly inverse relationship between urban built-up density and car
19 use. A drop in urban density below 40-50 inhabitants per hectare results in a sharp increase in car
20 use. This is reflected in the high factor scores for *spatial dispersion*, promoting automobility in
21 **Australia** (37 persons per hectare) and the **United States** (19 persons per hectare in 2014). . It is
22 also noteworthy that the urban built-up density has declined in **all OECD countries**. Hence, the
23 time trend towards increasing *spatial dispersion* favors automobility in **all OECD countries**
24 (**Table 2**). High urban population density itself may not be the actual reason for reduced driving
25 in dense urban environment. However, other important factors usually go along with high
26 population densities. This includes reduces needs to travel due to proximity to shopping and
27 other facilities and difficulties to find or afford parking. Hence, historically high urban densities
28 have correlated with reduced automobile travel and this relationship is likely to persist in most
29 instances.

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Figure 4 Density of urban built-up areas. Data: Angel et al. (2016). Own depiction.
[online in color]

5 The **BRICS countries** also show a declining density of representative urban built-up areas,
6 although particularly **China** and **India** starting from much higher levels. This decline is coupled
7 with a strong increase in urbanization, measured as share of population living in cities with more
8 than 300 000 inhabitants. **Brazil** started to convert already in the 1930s from an agricultural
9 economy into an industrialized one (Pojani & Stead 2017). Urbanization is strong and built-up
10 density relatively high (65 inhabitants per hectare). However, the spatial distribution of wealth is
11 very uneven. Today's Brazil knows large marginalized areas for the poor and gated communities
12 for the rich. While residents of gated communities heavily rely on the private car, people of low
13 income regularly have little access to cars. Accordingly, they have to cope with lacking
14 infrastructure for public transport, walking, and cycling that usually is only accessible for a small
15 middle-class in central areas (Pojani & Stead 2017). **China's** proportion of the population living
16 in cities with more than 300 000 inhabitants has doubled since 1990. As cities continue to
17 expand, the density of urban built-up areas has dropped from a notable high of 180 to 90
18 inhabitants per hectare. People settle increasingly in the suburbs, partly as a result of resettlement
19 policies. Additionally, settlements for migrant workers who cannot afford the cost of living in the
20 central urban areas are emerging around the cities (Pojani & Stead 2017). **India's** relatively large
21 rural population lives in smaller villages. Urbanization is increasing, though with more than 200
22 inhabitants per hectare Indian cities exhibit the highest densities among the study countries.
23 While the affluent population concentrates in urban centers and planned districts, less privileged
24 people are spreading to the urban periphery and regions outside the cities (Pojani & Stead 2017).

1 The urban structure of Indian cities favors two- and three-wheelers, nevertheless congestion is a
2 major issue (Verma et al. 2015). **Russia** is still characterized by a period of industrialization
3 during the Soviet era. While the population living in cities with more than 300 000 inhabitants
4 accounts for about 40%, the majority of the remaining population lives in smaller urban
5 settlements around industrial areas of Soviet origin. More recently, a process of suburbanization
6 has taken place, in particular driven by residential choices of Russian elites (Pojani & Stead
7 2017). The density of built-up areas has declined to less than 50 inhabitants per hectare.
8 Especially since the 2000s, a lack of spatial planning can be observed, with the consequence that
9 housing and economic activities are disintegrating. **South Africa** is the only BRICS country
10 whose spatial pattern is expected to be less conducive for automobility in future years, mostly
11 due to an increasing urbanization and continued high urban density. The spatial structure around
12 cities is fragmented, with residential areas still segregated along the lines of ethnicity and wealth.
13 Typical are radial transport networks (Pojani & Stead 2017), consisting of formal and informal
14 transport services.


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16 **Lack of alternatives**

17 The factor *lack of alternatives* refers to absence of alternatives to a private car (the higher the
18 factor, the more inductive to automobility). One number that indicates alternatives to the private
19 car are e.g. journeys of urban public transport per capita (UITP 2017). The data show the
20 differences between the four OECD countries. For the **BRICS countries**, only data for Brazil,
21 China and Russia can be obtained. **Brazil** and **China** show an increasing use of public
22 transportation. In **Russia** the decline in the use of public transport from very high levels reflect
23 the increasing individualism in post-Soviet **Russia** and the deterioration of the formerly
24 ubiquitous public transport system as basic service. Data for India and South Africa are not
25 available. Another indicator used is national passenger kilometers on road versus on rail (ITF
26 2017).

27 For the factor *lack of alternatives*, too, it is not sufficient to rely on official figures, as
28 alternatives to the private car can be formal public transport, but also informal services and
29 active modes, for which there are no official figures. For example, UITP (2017) only provides
30 figures urban bus, suburban bus, tram, light rail, metro, and suburban railway operated by

1 official utilities. Informal services are not included, but may play a role in **Brazil** and certainly
 2 do in **India** and **South Africa**.



3
 4 **Figure 5 Public transit journeys per capita. Own calculation and depiction based on UITP**
 5 **(2017).** [online in color]
 6

7 Among the OECD countries there are two groups: **Germany** and **Japan** show declining and
 8 ultimately very low factor scores (see **Table 2**), which corresponds to dampening automobility.
 9 In **Germany**, the evenly distributed small- to medium-size cities facilitate a fairly good
 10 nationwide supply of public transport. In **Japan**, it is the country's compact settlement structure
 11 coupled with high urbanization that favors public transport. While Japan continues to invest in its
 12 public transport infrastructure, the German system suffers from austerity measures and therefore
 13 has lost some service quality. Accordingly, in Japan 30% of the national passenger kilometers
 14 are conducted by rail, in Germany only 9% (ITF 2017). For **Australia** and the **United States** the
 15 *lack of alternatives* clearly favors automobility. Although the two countries differ considerably
 16 in terms of their public transport services, they have undergone an explicitly car-oriented
 17 development. Only in recent years, **Australia** has seen a significant revival of walking and
 18 cycling. This is largely stimulated by a trend towards healthier lifestyles and has a diminishing
 19 effect on the use of cars. The **United States**, on the other hand, has the lowest level of public
 20 transport trips per capita (UITP 2017), which even has declined in recent years. Public transport
 21 in the United States is often associated with low-income population and faces concerns related to
 22 status and security. New individual transport services further increase the pressure on the public
 23 transport system, despite the introduction of some (mostly municipal) programs aiming to
 24 promote walking and cycling and investing in rail and bus services.

1 **Brazil** has invested significantly into the public transit system in the context of the 2014 Soccer
2 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. However, due to spatial and income disparities, access
3 to transport services differs considerably between population groups. Many marginal areas are
4 poorly served by public transport. Furthermore, the quality of public transport has deteriorated in
5 recent years, leading to a further decline in demand. Besides some informal services, walking
6 and cycling are often the only viable options for many. **China** certainly stands out in its efforts to
7 improve public transport infrastructure, both within urban agglomerations and between cities.
8 The light rail and metro system has expanded substantially in the past decade (Gao et al. 2018),
9 also to reduce congestion that developed due to rapid motorization. Additionally, a resurgence of
10 two-wheelers, including the bicycle in the form of electric or rental bikes can be observed. The
11 provision of urban alternatives to the private car is often combined with regulations restricting
12 ownership and use of private motorized vehicles. Wu et al. (2016) argue that in many
13 metropolitan areas motorization saturation levels have already been reached. China has also
14 made very large investments in national rail. By 2017, 25 000 kilometers of rail tracks connected
15 over 200 cities, mostly in the central and eastern provinces, half of which are designed for high-
16 speed trains. An extension bringing the total to around 38 000 kilometers is planned for 2025
17 (Bullock et al. 2014). Based on official statistics, VKT by rail equals that of car travel (ITF
18 2017). In **India**, the predominant public transit is offered as bus services. Metro systems are still
19 at the early stage of development, and construction can barely keep pace with population growth
20 and urbanization. Due to the country's spatial structure, two- and three-wheelers are common
21 alternatives to the car, either privately owned or offered as commercial service. The countrywide
22 rail infrastructure is ubiquitous, but of poor quality. Accordingly, only 13% of the national
23 passenger kilometers are traveled by rail (ITF 2017). Governmental plans aim to improve public
24 transport as alternative to the private car, and therefore it is expected to dampen the development
25 towards automobility. As **Russia** is concerned, public transport was the back-bone of mobility
26 during the Soviet era. Since 1990, the use of public transport has declined dramatically, and
27 income disparities and suburbanization have furthered the infrastructure's deterioration. Only
28 recently, a national strategy aiming to significantly improve the transport infrastructure and
29 services, including high-speed rail, has been put in place (GIZ 2018). Until today, fares are
30 relatively low and this alternative to the private car is still accessible to a large number of
31 citizens. **South Africa** is the only BRICS country with the *lack of alternatives* factor is above

1 zero. Despite attempts by policy and planning, public transportation in South Africa faces
2 concerns with regard to security and comfort resulting in a lack of acceptance. Furthermore,
3 public investments often compete with informal services, mostly mini-buses, and sometimes face
4 fierce opposition.

5

6 **Summary findings on remaining factor scores**

7 Of the other factors, *active population*, *car infrastructure*, *pro-car policies* and *inexpensive*
8 *driving* have numeric factor weights above 2.

9 *Active population* as the “share of the population in a life stage characterized by high mobility
10 rates” (Ecola et al. 2014: 46) is a very important factor that influences automobility. All **OECD**
11 **countries** face a shrinking *active population*. However, other aspects such as retirement age,
12 unemployment, or formal and non-formal work need to be considered as well. Additionally, a
13 country’s ability to draw positive socio-economic impulses from the population development is
14 relevant. In this context, the World Bank (2016) differentiates pre-dividend, early-dividend, late-
15 dividend, and post-dividend countries. As for the **BRICS countries**, **India** and **South Africa**
16 belong to the early-dividend group, whereas **Brazil**, **China**, and **Russia** belong to the late-
17 dividend group. While early-dividend countries have a huge opportunity to build on their human
18 capital, late-dividend countries face a shrinking *active population*, but have the opportunity to
19 build and secure economic strength by investing their savings to increase the productivity of
20 labor. Prosperity and thus automobility will be adversely affected if a late-dividend country does
21 not succeed in securing labor productivity and assets acquired during earlier periods (World
22 Bank 2016).

23 **Brazil** was unable to take full advantage of the opportunities arising from its early-dividend
24 phase and risks to lose its wealth in the late-dividend phase (Berlin Institute 2015). Retirement
25 age is expected to increase and female labor participation is most likely to increase as well.

26 **China** has experienced strong economic growth in recent years and has used its prosperity to
27 invest into productivity gains and to prepare for an ageing society. However, the ageing of society
28 increases the likelihood that China will move towards a longer active working life. **India** still
29 belongs to the early-dividend group and thus can prosper, if the creation of productive job can

1 exceed population growth. The share of *active population* is increasing, but female labor
2 participation is rather low and inequality is high. Nonetheless, in regard to the factor *active*
3 *population*, **China** and **India** are the two countries with the highest factor scores in favor of
4 automobility. **Russia** is a late-dividend country with a shrinking *active population*. To counteract
5 this, Russia is raising the retirement age. Furthermore, labor migration to Russia may play a role
6 in the future. Like India, **South Africa** is one of the early-dividend countries with all its
7 opportunities. As a legacy of the apartheid era, however, the country is struggling with extreme
8 inequality and poverty. Unemployment is high, and life expectancy is comparatively low. South
9 Africa could only benefit from the early-dividend phase if new jobs were created and education
10 and productivity improved at the same time (Schellekens 2016). Its score for the factor *active*
11 *population* is therefore low.

12 With regard to *car infrastructure*, **Australia**, **Germany**, and the **United States** enjoy an
13 excellent road infrastructure. In most areas, parking space is abundant and usually affordable,
14 although particularly **Australia** and **Germany** have begun to focus more on non-auto
15 infrastructure. Compared to the OECD countries, for the **BRICS countries** it is expected that the
16 *car infrastructure* will not have a particularly beneficial effect on automobility.

17 The factor *pro-car policies* shows for all **OECD countries** a shift away from fostering the
18 private car. This is due both to local policies, for example to curb congestion, and to national
19 policies, for example to combat global warming. With the exception of **Japan**, however, none of
20 the **OECD countries** reaches a very low score. For the **BRICS countries** it is apparent that
21 particularly **China**, but also **India** attempt to implement policies that might dampen the use of
22 cars. These policies are implemented to mitigate congestion and to respond to environmental and
23 health concerns. However, in the past, restrictive policies have often been paralleled by policies
24 promoting the ownership and use of cars as a means of economic stimulus. Less political
25 interventions to car ownership and use is observed in the other **BRICS countries**.

26 With regard to *inexpensive driving* (in relation to income), it can generally be observed that
27 driving becomes cheaper in relative terms to income, the more developed the economy is. This
28 holds true for all **OECD countries** and is also supported by statistical data for the **BRICS**
29 **countries** (compare GIZ 2017). However, the **United States** stands out as the country where
30 automobility is most affordable.

1 Finally, there are the two factors with a weight below 2: *domestic car industry* and *car culture*.
2 Both probably have a stronger impact on car ownership than on VKT. The *domestic car industry*
3 still plays a major role in **Germany** and **Japan**, as it accounts for a large share of the national
4 economy. The score of the **United States** reflects the relative decline of its *domestic car industry*
5 compared to other wealth-creating sectors. Interestingly, for all **BRICS countries** it is expected
6 that the *domestic car industry* will gain relevance, although maybe not to the level of Germany
7 and Japan. However, given the size of the potential markets, this expectation seems quite
8 plausible. The importance of *car culture* – i.e. the role the automobile plays in popular culture –
9 is generally declining in the **OECD countries** and increasing in the **BRICS countries**.

10

11 **AUTOMOBILITY SCORES AND VKT PROJECTIONS FOR BRICS COUNTRIES**


12 Based on the factor scores in **Table 2**, we derived a combined automobilty score (AS) for each
13 country, computed as the weighted average of the single factor scores (**Table 3**, column
14 ‘**Automobility score VKT**’). As Ecola et al. (2014), we again applied a simple regression
15 analysis, using the VKT saturation levels from the Gompertz function as the explained variable
16 and the combined automobility score as the explanatory variable to derive probable VKT
17 saturation levels for the BRICS countries (**Figure 6**).

18 The saturation levels of VKT of this study update are generally lower than those of the earlier
19 study (**Table 3**). In particular, the two values for India and China point to increasing policy
20 interventions that will affect both VKT and car ownership.

1 **Table 3 Comparison of automobility scores for VKT, VKT saturation projections from the**
 2 **former study and its update.**

Country	Automobility score VKT (weighted average from Table 2)	VKT saturation projection (Ecola et al. 2014)	Updated VKT saturation projection
Australia	0.43	10 800 km	9 900 km
Germany	-0.24	9 700 km	8 400 km
Japan	-0.51	6 400 km	4 500 km
United States	0.87	16 300 km	15 100 km
Brazil	0.20	11 300 km	9 900 km
China	-0.39	7 800 km	6 000 km
India	-0.44	7 000 km	5 700 km
Russia	0.04	10 200 km	8 900 km
South Africa	0.62	NA	12 700 km

3



4

5 **Figure 6 Regression analysis of VKT saturation levels based on country automobility**
 6 **scores. [online in color]**

7

8 We further estimated the effect of the factor weights on the final results, since the factor weights
 9 also carry the burden of the participating experts' subjectivity. For this test, we adjusted the

1 factor weights by calculating two extremes: one where the externally (without policy influence)
2 dominated factors *active population* and *spatial dispersion* were weighted high (3) and the policy
3 dominated factors *lack of alternatives*, *pro-car policy* and *inexpensive driving* were weighted low
4 (1); in the second case we reversed the weighting, favoring the policy factors and lowering the
5 external factors. Furthermore a no-weighting case was tested. The resulting VKT of the two
6 extreme cases differ from the reference case between -8% (policy factor dominance China) and
7 +27% (external factor dominance China) (**Table 4**). Most importantly, the order of the countries
8 VKT does not change, although China and India result in similar VKT when considering the
9 policy factors in dominance. Secondly, the expected VKT rises in all countries but South Africa
10 when considering the external factor dominance, indicating a dampening of VKT through policy
11 interventions. This is most pronounced in China, where external factor dominance VKT is 27 %
12 above the reference, compared to 14 % in India for example. For Russia and South Africa the
13 effect of the sensitivity analysis is inconclusive and represents the contradicting influence within
14 the factor categories “external” and “policy” (e.g. *lack of alternatives* dampening car use and
15 *pro-car policy* promoting car use). Overall, the effect of factor weight alterations is limited.

16 **Table 4: Sensitivity analysis of the calculated Automobility Score and VKT, based on**
17 **the weighting variations.**

AS Score	Reference Score	External Factor dominance	Policy Factor dominance
Brazil	0,20	0,33	0,13
China	-0,39	-0,15	-0,47
India	-0,44	-0,32	-0,46
Russia	0,04	0,12	0,09
South Africa	0,62	0,56	0,59
VKT Saturation			
Brazil	9 900 km	10 800 km (+9%)	9 500 km (-4%)
China	6 000 km	7 600 km (+27%)	5 500 km (-8%)
India	5 700 km	6 500 km (+14%)	5 500 km (-4%)
Russia	8 900 km	9 400 km (+6%)	9 200 km (+3%)
South Africa	12 700 km	12 300 km (-3%)	12 500 km (-2%)

18

1 In the no-weight test case, the sequential order of the countries remains the same. VKT is
2 generally higher, except for South Africa and the differences are between -4 % (South Africa) to
3 +13 % (China).

4

5 **DISCUSSION**

6 The automobility scores encapsulate a broad range of conditions that favor or dampen
7 automobility in a single measure. Specifically, the USA features a high automobility score
8 reflecting conditions that are very conducive to automobility. Australia, Brazil, South Africa and
9 to some extent Russia are also leaning towards that extreme. Japan, India and China represent the
10 other end of the range, with Germany trending in that direction. In particular the factors *active*
11 *population*, *spatial dispersion*, *car infrastructure*, and *lack of alternatives* are responsible for this
12 distinction. The factor *active population* includes more than just the share of the working age
13 population, as it is linked to other socio-economic aspects. Particularly, the economies of Brazil
14 and South Africa are lagging behind their potential, theoretically associated with their dividend
15 phases. *Spatial dispersion* in combination with the *lack of alternatives* also strongly influence the
16 development towards automobility. Certain spatial structures favor automobility, while others at
17 least offer the opportunity to establish alternatives to the private car and thus impede
18 automobility.

19 It should be noted that particularly for India the spatial structure together with the increasing
20 population has already led to a massive overload of the existing infrastructure and congestion.
21 According to the TomTom traffic ranking, 65% additional travel time is required for Mumbai
22 and 58% for New Dehli due to congestion and the cities rank number one and four in the global
23 2018 Traffic Index (TomTom 2019). Thus, while this phenomenon is indirectly reflected in the
24 flag game approach, the future development of capacities and potential backdrops with regard to
25 automobility needs further attention. The future of automobility will also depend on the ability to
26 complement income growth with investment in infrastructure. Furthermore, it will be decisive
27 whether infrastructure investments will focus on the public transport infrastructure or on road
28 infrastructure, that way improving the alternatives to the private car. Infrastructure development
29 will also influence the ratio of two-, three-wheelers and passenger cars. In countries with high

1 congestion levels like India, the use of two- and three-wheelers is already high and may increase
2 in the future if road infrastructure cannot keep pace with income growth.

3 In addition to the above mentioned factors, the factor *pro-car policies* has a significant effect on
4 future development. It can be assumed that the factor *spatial dispersion* affects a country's *pro-*
5 *car policy*, as policies aim to counter challenges resulting from spatial structures, such as
6 congestion. Other concerns, e.g. the focus on air quality and public health, will lead to
7 regulations and influence *pro-car policies*. The ability to intervene in developments – whether it
8 is infrastructure investments or regulations on vehicle usage – is linked to the countries'
9 governance structures and the appreciation of transport offerings as commons. Particularly China
10 is influencing market development through governmental interventions and large scale state-run
11 investments.

12 We are confident that our analysis of VKT and car ownership represents a good approximation
13 of the future path of mobility in the countries under investigation. However, as of today, we
14 cannot be certain as to which technologies and business models will be used to serve future
15 transport demand. For example, the widespread use of shared vehicles may considerably reduce
16 the total number of cars needed to meet the anticipated mobility needs. Furthermore, two- and
17 three-wheelers will play an important and potentially increasing role in several countries.

18 Uncertainties in the predictions are due to the nature of the predictive process and the
19 subjectivity of expert judgements. The different VKT levels of the OECD countries – according
20 to Ecola et al. (2014) on the one hand and our update on the other – result from more heterogenic
21 patterns in the GDP data for the years 2011 to 2017. Hence, it indicates the uncertainties of
22 mathematical approaches originating in data and prediction algorithms. The overall uncertainty
23 of our projections cannot be quantified conclusively and requires ongoing observation of the
24 factors involved.

25

26 **CONCLUSIONS**

27 The analysis of data on GDP, population and VKT reveals that VKT development and saturation
28 levels cannot be explained by GDP and population alone. The inclusion of other factors provides
29 a sound approach to assess the development of VKT. However, those other factors cannot be

1 analyzed solely by statistical data due to either (i) partly missing data, or (ii) data of uncertain
2 quality and comparability. Therefore, the combination of quantitative analyses with qualitative
3 judgements is advisable. The automobility scores show a good correlation for the OECD
4 countries, thus predictions on VKT saturation for other countries can be made with a certain
5 confidence.

6 Further research is required with regard to all factors influencing automobility. In particular, the
7 relationship between spatial development, the emergence of new technologies and services and
8 policies warrants more attention.

9

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22 Pretoria, South Africa; Prof. Dr. Jeffrey R. Kenworthy, University of Applied Science, Frankfurt
23 Main/Germany, for Australia; Dr. Thomas Meissner, BMW, Munich, Germany; Dr. Marthetha
24 Mokonyama, Council for Industrial and Scientific Research, Pretoria, South Africa; Dr. Luiz
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28 University, Nagoya, Japan; and Dr. Johanna Zmud, Texas A&M Transportation Institute,
29 Arlington, United States.

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

The authors confirm contribution to the paper as follows: study conception and design: Stefan Seum, Tobias Kuhnimhof; data collection: Angelika Schulz, Stefan Seum; analysis and interpretation of results: Stefan Seum, Angelika Schulz, Tobias Kuhnimhof; draft manuscript preparation: Stefan Seum, Angelika Schulz. All authors reviewed the results and approved the final version of the manuscript.

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42
43 **Appendix**

44 Values of the Gompertz function depicted in **Figure 1**.
45

AUS	AUS std.error	GER	GER std.error	JPN	JPN std.error	USA	USA std.error
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Υ	9,91E+03	9,32E+01	8,50E+03	1,41E+02	6,00E+03	3,84E+02	1,52E+04	1,79E+02
α	2,04E+01	3,37E+00	7,02E+00	3,96E-01	5,25E+00	3,41E-01	5,93E+00	4,15E-01
β	1,77E-04	8,61E-06	9,58E-05	3,42E-06	7,20E-05	5,69E-06	9,33E-05	3,76E-06

1